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v. * Case No. 920141-CA 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH * Priority No. 7 
ROBERT L. SEITZ, * 
Defendants. * 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR REVIEW OF ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
I. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from the Industrial Commission of Utah's 
Order Denying Motion for Review issued on February 7, 1992. 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is found in Utah Code Annotated 
Sections 35-1-82.53 and 35-1-86 (1988). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether, as a matter of law, this Permanent Total 
Disability Compensation case, having been subject to a 
final Permanent Total Disability Order by the Industrial 
Commission and completely closed out by full compliance 
with that Order and in accordance with the applicable 
permanent total disability Statute, is beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Commission to reopen more than 40 years 
later and order additional compensation by applying a 
statutory amendment enacted 30 years after the injury? 
(R-237) 
2. Whether, as a matter of law, the levels of compensation 
benefits on the one hand and compensation liability on the 
other are determined by the Statute in effect at the time 
of the injury and thus cannot be altered by a Statute 30 
years later which attempts to increase of enlarge those 
benefits and which creates an entirely new liability (in 
this Plaintiff) for such increased benefits, (R-237-238) 
3c In any event, whether the 1977 Amendment to the Permanent 
Total Disability Statute (Section 35-1-67) is in fact 
reasonably susceptible to the interpretation accorded to it 
by the Commission majority as conferring an entirely new 
lifetime benefit to applicant and imposing an entirely new 
liability upon this Plaintiff, rather than simply combining 
separate paragraphs of existing lifetime benefits and 
providing recipients each with identical cost-of-living 
increases. (R-23 8) 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Appellate Review applicable to each of the 
above Issues is "correction of error" since they involve questions 
of law or Statutory construction and thus no deference to the 
Commission's determination is required. Bevans v. Industrial 
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Commission, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
IV. APPLICABLE STATUTES 
The only relevant Statutory law consists of a series of 
Amendments to the Permanent Total Disability Provisions of what was 
then entitled the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. As pertinent to 
this controversy, these Amendments are set forth as follows: 
A. H.B. No. 6, in effect July 1, 1945, amending Permanent 
Total Disability Section 42-1-63, Utah Code Annotated 1943 
and providing for a dollar limitation on Permanent Total 
Disability benefits. This is the Statute in effect at the 
time of Applicant's permanent total disability injury on 
July 28, 1948 and is attached as Exhibit "A". (R-243-245) 
B. S.B. No. 43, in effect May 9, 1939, showing the Permanent 
Total Disability Statute in effect prior to the Amendments 
of 1945 set forth above. The pertinent provision is 
Section 42-1-63 Revised Statutes of Utah and is attached as 
Exhibit "B" (R-247). Note that lifetime benefits from the 
Employer were provided until removed by the July 1, 1945 
Amendment in Exhibit "A". 
C. S.B. No. 289, in effect March 5, 1949, completely changed 
the Permanent Total Disability procedures and provisions, 
requiring for the first time referral to the Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation before a final PTD Order could be 
issued. This Amendment also restored lifetime benefits 
after maximum benefits required from the Employer/Carrier 
had been satisfied. This Amendment, attached as Exhibit 
"C", (R-248-250) also provided for the first time, 
liability on the part of the Special (Second Injury) Fund 
for such lifetime benefits following termination of the 
Employer/Carrier obligation. 
D. S.B. 242, in effect July 1, 1971, increased PTD benefits 
and in addition provided a minimum compensation benefit for 
all persons then receiving lifetime benefits from the 
Special (Second Injury) Fund. (Exhibit "D") (R-250 at 253) 
E. S.B. 77, in effect July 1, 1973, increased PTD benefits and 
increased, also beginning July 1, 1971, compensation 
benefits for all permanently and totally disabled persons 
who were then receiving benefits from the Special Fund. 
Exhibit "E" (R-254 at 257) 
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F. S.B. No. 3, in effect April 4, 1974, increased PTD benefits 
and also increased to $50.00 per week, the PTD compensation 
for persons currently receiving permanent total disability 
benefits from the Special Fund. In addition, this 
Amendment picked up persons who were still receiving 
lifetime benefits from the Employer/Carrier under Statutes 
in effect prior to the March 5, 1949 Amendment which 
charged the Special Fund with all lifetime benefits after 
termination of Employer/Carrier liability. This 1974 
Amendment, attached as Exhibit "F" (R-259 at 260), required 
the Special Fund to pay the difference between the amount 
then being paid to such persons by the Employer/Carrier and 
the $50.00 weekly minumum set by the Statute for all 
persons then on the Second Injury Fund payroll. This 
Amendment did not apply to anyone not receiving lifetime 
benefits at the date of the Amendment. 
G. H.B. 297, in effect May 10, 1977, combined the two 
paragraphs pertaining to minimum benefits for Second Injury 
Fund participants set forth in the 1974 Statute and also in 
the 1975 Statute and increased to $75.00 the minimum weekly 
amount for all persons receiving benefits from the Fund. 
The Statute is attached as Exhibit "G" (R-262 at 265). 
Applicant has alleged that this Amendment somehow creates a 
new entitlement in Applicant to lifetime benefits and 
imposes an entirely new liability upon this Plaintiff for 
all of those benefits. Plaintiff denies both allegations 
in their entirety. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
There is no controversy as to the facts involved in this 
case. Briefly, they may be summarized as follows: 
1. Applicant was severely injured in July, 1948; therefore, 
his benefits for permanent total disability were those 
specified in the Statute in effect at that time, i.e.. 
Section 42-1-63 U.C.A. 1943, as Amended July 1, 1945 
(Exhibit MAU) (R-243 to R245). That Statute specifically 
deleted existing language which granted lifetime 
compensation benefits in permanent total disability cases 
4 
(Exhibit "B") (R-246,247). The 1945 Amendment expressly 
restricted permanent total disability compensation benefits 
to a maximum of $8,500, all to be paid by the 
Employer/Carrier beginning as of the date of the injury. 
On August 27, 1948, the Industrial Commission issued its 
Order (attached as Exhibit "H") (R-267) awarding maximum 
permanent total disability compensation benefits as follows: 
"Now therefore, it is Ordered, that Utah Fuel 
company pay to Robert Seitz all medical and 
hospital expenses incurred, and compensation at 
the rate of $25.88 per week, until the amount of 
$8,500.00 has been paid." 
That Order was made pursuant to Statute; it became final 
and was fully satisfied by Employer Utah Fuel Company, thus 
completely closing out Applicant's compensation entitlement. 
On July 9, 1990, more than forty (40) years following the 
satisfaction of Applicant's permanent total disability 
Order. Applicant filed his claim for continuing total 
disability benefits alleging that the same would be due and 
owing to Applicant from the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund 
since the Employer has satisfied its legal liability in the 
matter. Incidentally, the record shows that the Employer, 
in addition to payment of the Statutory maximum permanent 
total disability liability of $8,500.00 for Applicant's 
Statutory total disability, created a dispatcher position 
for the Applicant who remained employed with the Employer 
until his retirement in February, 1976 at age 64. 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, Plaintiff herein, denied 
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completely any liability to Applicant, asserting that 
Applicant has been paid in full for all permanent total 
disability benefits due to him under the Statute in effect 
at the time of his injury (Exhibit "A") (R-243) which 
Statute made it clear that there were no payments due to 
Applicant after the Statutory maximum of $8,500.00 has been 
satisfied by the Employer. At the same time. Plaintiff 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund pointed out that the 1945 
Statutory Amendment applicable to Applicant's claim 
intentionally and specifically amended the prior permanent 
total disability Statute of April, 1939 (Exhibit "B") 
(R-246) which provided for lifetime benefits from the 
Employer in permanent total disability cases. 
Applicant responded, asserting that subseguent legislation 
from 1949 through 1977 imposed lifetime permanent total 
disability liability upon the Second Injury Fund (now 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund) after the Employer's liability 
has been extinguished, that it operated somehow either to 
revive Applicant's original entitlement to permanent total 
disability benefits or to create for Applicant a new 
entitlement to lifetime benefits from the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, thus entitling Applicant to be placed on 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund payroll for the remainder 
of his life at the applicable permanent total disability 
rate. 
On May 21, 1991, the Administrative Law Judge issued his 
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Order holding that somehow the permanent total disability 
Statutory Amendment of 1977 either restored or created a 
lifetime entitlement in Applicant to permanent total 
disability benefits from the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund at 
the Statutory minimum permanent total disability rate. 
(Exhibit "I") (R-268) 
On June 20, 1991, Employers1 Reinsurance Fund, hereinafter 
called Plaintiff, filed with the full Industrial Commission 
its Motion for Review asserting that as a matter of law. 
Applicant has no Workers' Compensation right against 
Plaintiff or against his Employer Utah Fuel Company (Kaiser 
Coal) arising out of his industrial injury of July 28, 
1948. Plaintiff further asserted that this permanent total 
disability compensation case, having been subject to a 
final permanent total disability Order by the Industrial 
Commission and completely closed out by full compliance 
with that Order, was beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Commission to reopen for the alleged purpose of ordering 
additional compensation. (Exhibit "J") (R-273) 
On February 7, 1992, the full Industrial Commission in a 2 
to 1 decision issued its Order Denying Motion for Review 
upholding the Findings and Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge as being "supported in this case by substantial 
evidence in light of the whole record". (Exhibit "K") 
(R-279) 
Plaintiff, on March 6, 1992, filed with this Court its 
7 
Petition for Writ of Review seeking reversal of the 
Commission's Order and requesting dismissal of Applicant's 
claim for further benefits. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1, Under established Utah Workers Compensation Law, the 
Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction to reopen 
a PTD case based upon the same injury 30 years later where 
there is a final Order of PTD and where, as here, there is 
no question as to Statutory compliance, or correction of 
error in the previous PTD Order. 
2* Workers Compensation liability and the amount and duration 
of benefits in Utah Permanent Total Disability cases are 
determined by the Statute in effect on the date of the 
industrial injury causing the PTD and thus a Statutory 
Amendment 30 years later cannot be applied: (1) to create 
new and increased benefits (lifetime) which had been 
expressly rejected in the Statute properly applicable to 
the injury in question, and (2) to create a new liability 
in a party which had no liability whatsoever under the 
applicable PTD Statute on the date of the injury. 
3. In any event - without conceding any lack of validity in 
either of the above-mentioned arguments, neither the 1977 
Amendment to the PTD Statute (now Section 35-1-67) nor any 
of the prior amendments at various times referred to by 
Applicant's counsel, is in fact reasonably susceptible to 
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the interpretation accorded it by the Commission majority 
as conferring a lifetime benefit upon Applicant and a 
completely new liability against this Plaintiff. Instead, 
properly construed, it simply combines previous separate 
paragraphs applicable to existing lifetime PTD recipients 
and provides to them identical cost-of-living increases. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER ESTABLISHED UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO REOPEN A PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY CASE BASED UPON THE SAME INJURY 30 
YEARS LATER WHERE THERE IS A FINAL ORDER OF 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AND WHERE, AS HERE, 
THERE LS NO QUESTION AS TO STATUTORY COMPLIANCE 
OR CORRECTION OF ERROR IN THE PREVIOUS PERMANENT 
TOTAL DISABILITY ORDER. 
This position of Plaintiff is purely a matter of law and 
the applicable rationale has been the subject of clear-cut decisions 
of this Court as well as the Supreme Court of Utah with reference to 
reopening or rearguing claims which have been processed to final 
Order as is the case in this controversy. 
There was only one industrial accident in this case, that 
of July 28, 1948. That accident was accepted by the Employer as 
resulting in Permanent Total Disability (Exhibit "H-2") (R-193). A 
Final Order was issued by the Industrial Commission pursuant to the 
Utah Workers Compensation Act applicable to that injury. Section 
42-1-63 Rev. State of Utah (Exhibit HB") (R-171-172). That Order 
(Exhibit "H") (R-192) set forth all the benefits to Applicant under 
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Utah Workers Compensation Law and it is acknowledged that the Order 
was never questioned or disputed as to the amount or duration of 
benefits, or at all. Indeed, even today there is no claim that the 
Order was somehow in error as to amount or duration of benefits or 
was left open or undetermined in any aspect. Accordingly, it is 
conclusive that the Order of August 27, 1948 (Exhiibt "H") (R-192) 
was a final Order that set forth all of Applicant's compensations 
rights under Utah Law and, as such, was determinative of all 
Applicant's rights to compensation under applicable Utah Workers 
Compensation Law. 
Utah Supreme Court Decisions recognizing this principle are 
as early as 1924 in Fergusen v. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 112, 
221 P.1099 (1924). reaffirmed in 1967 in Kennecott Copper 
Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952 
(1967) where it was held that the holding in Fergusen was 
dispositive and that the Commission once having determined the 
matter on the merits did not have jurisdiction to make any other 
award. 
Following these cases, this Court in Retherford v., 
Industrial Commission, 739 P.2d 76 (Utah App. 1987) held: "that the 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission over Workers' Compensation 
cases is fixed by Statute, as is this Court's jurisdiction over 
judicial review of the Commission's Orders" (citing authorities) and 
further, that "This Court is without jurisdiction to review the 
final Order of the Commission because Plaintiff's Petition for Writ 
of Review was not timely filed". 739 P.2d 76 at 80.. 
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In addition, this Court applied the Supreme Court of Utah's 
holding in Pease v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 
1984) that a claimant has an obligation to raise all issued that can 
be presented at that time and those issues not raised are waved (739 
P.2d at 79, 80). The Retherford Decision is attached as (Exhibit 
"L" ). 
Applying the rationale of the above authorities to this 
case, it is apparent that Applicant was awarded - and paid - by 
Commission Order all the benefits provided by the applicable 
permanent total disability Statute. He did not claim lifetime 
benefits which were obtainable as to injuries prior to July 1, 1945 
but were expressly deleted the July 1, 1945 Amendment to the 
permanent total disability Statute. Nor did he claim lifetime 
benefits at that time or in 1949 when the Statute was amended again 
to provide lifetime benefits for permanently and totally injured 
workers who qualified under the provisions of that Statute. Indeed, 
even had he applied for or claimed lifetime benefits under the 1949 
Amendment, such claim would properly have been dismissed for (1) 
failure to raise the lifetime benefit question under the Order 
granting him benefits, and (2) clear-cut application of Utah 
Workers' Compensation Law which determines benefits under the 
Statute in effect on the date of injury. (See cases and authorities 
referred to in Point 2, to follow). 
POINT II 
WORKERS COMPENSATION LIABILITY AND THE AMOUNT AND 
DURATION OF BENEFITS IN UTAH PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY CASES ARE DETERMINED BY THE STATUTE IN 
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EFFECT ON THE DATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY 
CAUSING THE PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AND THUS A 
STATUTORY AMENDMENT 30 YEARS LATER CANNOT BE 
APPLIED: (1) TO CREATE NEW AND INCREASED 
BENEFITS (LIFETIME) WHICH HAD BEEN EXPRESSLY 
REJECTED IN THE STATUTE PROPERLY APPLICABLE TO 
THE INJURY IN QUESTION. AND (2) TO CREATE A NEW 
LIABILITY IN A PARTY WHICH HAD NO LIABILITY 
WHATSOEVER UNDER THE APPLICABLE PTD STATUTE ON 
THE DATE OF THE INJURY. 
This Argument of Plaintiff is established Utah Workers' 
Compensation Law and is supported, without exception, by Supreme 
Court Decisions as well as decisions of this Court. In the case of 
Smith v. Industrial Commission. 549 P.2d 448 (Utah, 1976) the 
workman was injured in 1968 and died in 1972. His widow claimed 
compensation death benefits under 1973 Amendments to the Statute 
which increased and enlarged such death benefits. Even though, the 
Commission award was not made until 1975, after the Amendments 
became effective, it was held by the Commission, affirmed by an 
unanimous Supreme Court, that: "The benefits were definable as to 
maximum time and amount, were governed by the wording of the section 
on date of injury (citing Utah Road Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319 (1946) and it appears that 
the award fully complied with or exceeded such provision", and 
further: 
Any additional benefits would not be awardable by 
Amendment thereafter, and subsection 4, paragraphs 5 
and 6 so amended in 1973 that did enlarge such 
benefits would have no application here. 549 P.2d at 
449. Attached hereto as Exhibit ,!MH. 
The rationale of the Smith case, above, is squarely 
applicable to this controversy where claimant Seitz was injured 
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attched as Exhibit "N", where this Court reviewed and discussed the 
general rule of application of the law existing at the time of the 
injury for determination of liability and benefits in Workers1 
Compensation cases and also the limited exceptions to the general 
rule. Those exceptions still apply, this Court held: (1) If 
Amendments are procedural rather than substantive and do not 
enlarge. eliminate or destroy vested rights or impose greater 
liability then they may be applied retroactively. Or if they "are 
enacted to clarify or amplify how the earlier law should have been 
understood, in other words remedial in nature, the Amendments can 
still be retroactively applied.11 (Citing cases) (771 P.2d at 687) 
This Court then held that a Statutory Amendment which decreased or 
diminished the liability of this Fund (then called Second Injury 
Fund) and increased the Employer/Carrier percentage liability was 
held to be substantive rather than procedural in nature and not 
susceptible to the clarification rule and thus the later Amendment 
could not be applied retroactively to reduce the liability of the 
Second Injury Fund. So it is with this case, Applicants injury on 
July 28, 1948 entitled him, without question, only to a maximum 
amount of $8,500. He specifically was by the 1945 Amendment to the 
Permanent Total Disability Statute denied lifetime benefits which 
previously had been awarded to workers injured under the prior 
Statute. That award was paid in full by the Employer thus closing 
out all compensation benefits. He now seeks lifetime benefits which 
specifically were denied to him and he seeks to impose liability for 
those lifetime benefits upon all the employers of the State of Utah 
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w h o f I n a n c e e n t i i: e 1 y t: ti e E m p ] o y e r s ' R e i n s u i: a n c e F u n d , P1 a i n. t i f f i n 
A... i- ? I I I lii'i i i . I in he ,i\\v rnni i i ,1 (Mm v m r nl I al> i 1 i 1 \ LII 
•rse a p p l i c a t i ) u and ] fit ei pt e t a t i on of t h i s S t a t u t e do i n t e r p i e t etl by 
t h i s f o u r t and t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u i l , t h e n P l n i n t i t t *s p o s i t i o n on 
I  I I I ? ) I 1 111 H ' r i l | l M M . I ' l H H I I l i I II H I 1 ' i I ' 11 I I » 1 1 I I I  I I \ 1 1 1 1 I | I H i l l I " 11 11 II I  I I  I I I I l l » J W 
and increased lifetime benefits properly should IIH dismissed 
POINT I I I 
IN ANY EVENT WITHOUT CONCEDING ANY LACK OF 
VALIDITY IN EITHER OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED 
ARGUMENTS - NEITHER THE 1977 AMENDMENT TO THE 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY STATUTE (NOW SECTION 
35-1-67) NOR ANY OF THE PRIOR AMENDMENTS AT 
VARIOUS TIMES REFERRED TO BY APPLICANT'S COUNSEL, 
IS IN FACT REASONABLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE 
INTERPRETATION ACCORDED IT BY THE COMMISSION 
MAJORITY AS CONFERRING A LIFETIME BENEFIT UPON 
APPLICANT AND A COMPLETELY NEW LIABILITY AGAINST 
THIS PLAINTIFF. INSTEAD, PROPERLY CONSTRUED, IT 
SIMPLY COMBINES PREVIOUS SEPARATE PARAGRAPHS 
APPLICABLE TO EXISTING LIFETIME PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY RECIPIENTS AND PROVIDES TO THEM 
IDENTICAL COST-OF-LIVING INCREASES. 
Plaint 11-1 LM-' I i i.'Yf i.. " " |M'!» f i i "i ', i 'i» l i I'i M ' e i •' \ } 11 I 
be dispositive of Applicant's entice claim in this controversy. 
However Plaintiff also believes that UQJia ol the Statutory 
Amendments asserted by Applicant IR reasonably susceptible Mi I tie 
interpretation accorded Mi those Statutes by Applicant or hy the 
«i 'mint! i ss i on A i I nf Mn' ("<i r t i neti I" f>! a f \if \»t y Amendments have been 
attached to assMst this I'ourl in what in rxcliiMively a quest iur of 
Statutory interpretation to be m.jdo by Mils Court with no deference 
e i t in ' " "L »r I mi 1 nil n I' r .:i t Ii VP 1 ru i .1 iihlqe t h e 
Commiss * o n. ^e Chris 6* Dicks Lumber and Hardware v. Tax 
mmissioi., /JO. . .2d 511 ^ ^ b^.*
 VwLah 1990) "la straight forward 
1,5 
cases of statutory interpretation, however, we need not defer to the 
agency in question." 
Plaintiff is aware of the oft-asserted principle that the 
Act should be liberally construed in favor of according benefits and 
that questions of fact in doubt should be construed in favor of the 
Employee. However, it is also well established-as mentioned above -
that where statutory intent is clear and where "the Statute can be 
interpret«ted in accordance with traditional rules of statutory 
construction, we conclude that the Legislature has not left this 
issue unresolved11, and therefore we need not give any deference to 
the Divisions (Commission's) interpretation* Ferro v. Utah 
Department of Commerce, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 (Utah App. 1992). 
(Exhibit "O" attached). Moreover, implicit in statutory 
construction and interpretation is that Appellate courts have the 
fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of a 
Statute. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 248, 253, referred to in 
Ferro, Supra, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. at 63. Finally, in statutory 
interpretation upon review, "Statutes should be read so as to avoid 
making any of their provisions surplusage and meaningless" Ferro, 
Supra, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. at 63, citing Downey State Bank v. Major 
Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978) and Baqshaw v. 
Baqshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990). 
It is Plaintiff's belief that examination of all the 
pertinent Amendments to the Permanent Total Disability provisions of 
the applicable Utah Workers Compensation Statute will show beyond 
question that the Utah Legislature at no time intended to create 
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lifetime benefits for any Permanent Total Disability recipient not 
ii [p.iUy I P P P I I M M | lid1! i HIP iM-nH i t i, undor t tie PTD Statute in pf I pot; 
mi the date of injury Nor «ii«1 il intend to assess this I lain .it: 
with 100% "liability where it had no liability under I ho £i» iln?<> in 
fJ I t PP I "I ' ' l i -1! H P 1" H | |J I I i ' r l l U " - 1 | "J ' V 
The f o l l o w i n g summary of t h e r e l e v a n t Permanent T o t a l 
D i s a b i l i t y S ta t nt or y Amendments is e s s e n t i a l to p rope r a n a l y s i s and 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ol th.H 101 j I. u I P HI, ill in >i x i s t . i ii im Il I i l ' * 
i n t e n t nt t h e v a r i o u s Amendments made by I he L e g i s l a t u r e a f f e c t i n g 
i:eci p i en I ii o 1 PITma n»»111 T o t a l D i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s i n t h i s S t a t e , 
1 . E x h i b i l "A111 (H-168-171)) otleof. iv t J u l y I I'M'i Th . s 
t h e Pe r ma nen 1 To t a 1 0 i s a b 1111 y S f a t u l: e i n e f f e c t <i ri t he 
clalp I I ! | ipl]PHMt'n inly 'H I 'Ml H Permanent T o t a l 
D i s a b i l i t y i n j u r y . Note t h a t a maximum b e n e f i t amount was 
i n s e r t e d for the f i r s t t ime in Permanent "Total D i s a b i l i t y 
c a s e s .-j ii <1 t: ha t f' I m •," 1 jJL i^ tjyue Li e 11 v t i l s r i.- q i J i 11»».l p t l o i t o l h i s 
Amendment were e x p r e s s l y removed by Hie Amendment, See 
Com2iI^Ll^..„ JNo.les,, S e c t i o n 3 S •  I - h 7 li t a n C o d e A n n o t a r e d . 
Replacement V* »1 nine 4 h , I "# t n | p m M I flu „ .* 11 a< I'M- I ho ir e l o 
as E x h i b i t " P " . The Order of flit: Commission ( E x h i b i t "BM) 
( R - ! 32 I i s sued on Auqus t ;?7 1 948 was based upon t h i s 
S t a t u t e and was pa i d i 11 ! 11 I ! " \ '.! • Km| !««;'»i . 
2 . E x h i b i t "B" (R--171, 172)- Tills i , the Permanent T o t a l 
II") •; I a I  mi 11' e ,, S 0 0 1 1 * 4 ( M i n e f f o r t n f i II j t i  i t h e 
Amendment; ot / -1. - 4 5 (Ex* A'l wli i li deipted H I P 
lifetime benefit entitlemerv * fh existed under th s 
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Statute and. indeed, compensation Statutes even prior to 
1939. Therefore, there are Employees who incurred 
Permanent Total Disability injuries prior to the 1945 
Amendment who have always been entitled to - and paid -
lifetime Permanent Total Disability benefits. 
Exhibit "C" (R-173-175). As indicated in the Compiler's 
Notes, this Amendment, effective March 5, 1949, rewrote the 
entire Permanent Total Disability Section 42-1-63, 
inserting new provisions for referral to Rehabilitation 
Division prior to a final award and then for the first time 
providing for Special Fund (now Employers1 Reinsurance 
Fund) liability for lifetime benefits after compensation 
liability of Employer/Carrier had terminated. Surely, it 
cannot be contended that this Amendment - which increases 
benefits from a dollar maximum to lifetime and also 
provides for a new payer (Special Fund) of such lifetime 
benefits - cannot be construed to cover Applicant's injury 
even though payments had not been completed at the time of 
the 1949 Amendment. This Amendment is significant to this 
case because it designates its March 5, 1949 effective date 
as being the date after which all Permanent Total 
Disability injuries are entitled to lifetime benefits, just 
as were those injured prior to the July 1, 1945 Amendment 
set forth in Exhibit "A". 
Exhibit "D" (R-176-178). This Amendment, effective July 1, 
1971 is significant because it provided for the first time 
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arMi 1 i i iiJril (oust - of-living) bonefits for all permanently 
and tot.ally (Usabled persons, rhnn receiving benefits from 
the L("Ot;iJ I Pun 1 (IIPW KRF } I I i -
understand] nq oi the later critical Amending 
I K x II 1 Hi I I !«: ! Iln" 179 L»,!) U N , (BxhiuiL *, ", ,
 vk-xb4-j.8S j 
and I '» / ( Kxliibt '(!" » 1H LU/ IB'1!' | 
Exhibit "E" (R-l J :.-. ffectiv* . ul.- "'r 
clUU 
d i s a b -ii \:i i :,i. :i. then. » — * i v a: . ^ -iupeuoa u , ..:.- from t h i s Fund 
- < ; • ' ' • • • - '•• i * .\,\ x ~ '- h h a j • • . a : " 
comptr 
increao - -• • t - • ; -*- - -* . -h.^  
c iec i i LuaL Luc lf'- apply -* e r s o n s then 
r e c e i v i n g p e r m a n e n t I ui .J I d i s r i l n I i t y I,HMKJI I l U I nr uin 
Special Kiiiid i KRl* | - ifice l lie 19 4y Amendment become 
ef f e c t i v e. 
Exhibit . l 'R 184, 1 8 ^ ° n p c h v e Api 
Amendment w^ - . J , i- uniform minimum benefi 
then receiving lifetime . • :«- ,i -,. ^i . w » 
B^mplr -< -.,*,>,- ;»Mij.-f applicable legisI^'L 
Mc 
Marc* - .. - ,M . c c u - i l i u j Amendments 
at • * f i r s t tin.*- ^ c i p i e n t s 
l i f e i . JL.J 
prior to March S, 194 9, could receive the same minimum 
19 
benefits as all other lifetime recipients who qualified for 
Special Fund lifetime benefits from and after March 5, 
1949. For the first time, it provided for Special Fund 
payments to make up the difference between the 
Employer/Carrier payments and $50,00 per week. 
Certainly, this also cannot properly be interpreted as 
somehow applying to anyone not receiving lifetime benefits 
as of the July 1, 1974 effective date of that provision. 
This Plaintiff submits that this is the basis for not only 
the 1975 Amendment which increased the minimum payment but 
also for the 1977 and succeeding Amendments which simply 
combined the eligibility requirements for lifetime 
recipients of permanent total disability benefits under 
legislation on and after March 5, 1949 for Special Fund 
recipients and prior to that date for recipients receiving 
lifetime benefits from the Employer or Carrier under any 
legislation prior to the March 5, 1949 Amendatory Act which 
covered all permanently and totally disabled persons on and 
after that date. 
7. Exhibit "G" (R-187-189), effective May 10, 1977. This is 
the Amendment grasped by the Commission and, finally by 
Applicants Counsel, as somehow creating lifetime benefits 
where none existed before and creating a liability (in this 
Fund) where none existed before. 
The Title to the Act on R-188 identifies who were intended 
to benefit from the new Permanent Total Disability language 
20 
(now Section 35 -1-67, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended) 
] '' i: e < 11 i :i i: :i ii • :j 'minimum b e n e f i t s f o r a 1 1 sped arl fund 
participants' • T h a t: language iden 11 f""" i e s t h o s e a £ f e c t e • I a s 
being participants i  n the Speci a] Fund App1icant c1ear1y 
v p e c :i a ] Fi i nd p a r t i c i p a n t no r wa s h e e ve r e n t i 11 e d 
t lifetime b e n e f i t s f r o m t h e S p e c i a ] F u n d o i: f i: o m Ii i s 
Employ ' 
Ni.we II I lie 1 e s s , I Ik- '."lummi sis i on t\\u\ in n« i" \ p p I i . can l I n Ik .i l: l. t ie 
phrase* " i n c l u d i n g those injured pi Lor to N o v e m b e r 6, P H 9 " 
as ncvu c r e a t i n g «i new li f e t i m e benefit for Applicant ami a 
ne w 1 ifretinte d isabl I U y ton the 1,1 pec i a 1 la" i J ii< I iiJesp i t„e the 
re f e r e n c e i r i I" I i <•:• t i t 1 e that e s t a b 1 i s h e s the i n c r e a s e d 
1
 mini mum hone I' i ( s I )i -j \ 1 imperial Fond part ic i pants". 
Certainly App1icanl was not a SpeeiaI fund par Li < i pant to 
get the new mini muni benefit, Moreover, a close reading of 
1 11 e *. i' i J I J i" y i 11 <j I a n q'" i a q c •,» i i* h«» b * •* «"i i n 11 " i "„| o r t h e | > -i i: a q r a p h 
makes it cieai that the new pacagi.aph applies only to those 
"permanently and total 1 y d i s a b 1 e d ami., entitled to benefits 
from the Special Fund „ A [»p 1 i»:" 1111 L !;> i \ (\ t \? u <" 11 p •"• r s o i a n d 
thus is riot intended for a p p l i c a t i o n of; this A m e n d m e n t 
w h i c h is sirapl\ a c o m b i n a t ' n » I^ J • w> f • AI* : raq ^phs 
w h i (i in, I e i e s e p a r a l e i y > * i , 
respectively, 
B u i: t h e i: a n a ] y s i s s h o w s the e x p 1 a n a t i o n £ o r a 1 1, t h e 1 a n g u a g e 
u s e d i n t h e c o m b i n e d p a r a g r a p h T h a t e x: p ] a n a t i • :> n i 3 a s 
followsi 
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ac The new language: ". . and entitled to benefits from 
the Special Fund . . ." includes: (i) persons 
permanently and totally disabled and receiving 
benefits from the Special Fund because all such 
permanently and totally disabled persons after March 
5, 1949 automatically by the terms of the Permanent 
Total Disability Statutes in effect during all such 
years after March 5, 1949 are entitled to Special Fund 
benefits after termination of Employer/Carrier 
payments; and (ii) persons permanently and totally 
disabled and entitled to and receiving benefits from 
the Special Fund as a result of the 1974 Amendment 
referred to in Exhibit "F" (R-184-185) and its 
successor Amendment in 1975 which merely increased the 
minimum benefit., It was not intended to refer to any 
other permanently and totally disabled persons who 
were not already receiving lifetime benefits. This 
squares with the, ^ title, which correctly states: 
"Requiring/(special Fund participants, , . -
Finally, if the Commissions interpretation is accepted, 
there is no need for any of the language used in the Amendment other 
than to say: "All persons permanently and totally disabled shall 
receive not less than $75.00 per week when paid only by the Special 
Fund or when combined with compensation payments of the Employer or 
the Insurance Carrier." 
There would be no need whatsoever to make the distinction 
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so careful] y made in, -K^ lr>7"! f^ti:*-^ *~Uri l c > n ^ r ^ I^-M Amendments 
and the ] 975 Amendment "^  * h.^1 p*- * f \ r m o a n i n q ? »• -' 
liiii Ii : were e l i g i bl e 
Amend a t o i: y S t a t u t e s ,. 
In s u m m a E y # to fo 11 ow tIie e s t a b 1 :i shed r u 11 es and ra t i ona 1 e 
f o r s t a t ii t o r v r o n s t r u c t i o n a n ci t c: • g :i u e m e a n :i ii g 1: • :: • t h e 1: a • s :i c: a i i • :! t li e 
q u a l i f y I n g a ngua g e a s t c: e 1 i g i b i 1:1 t y , t h e o n l y r e a s o n a b l e 
: * , • : - *" • ::: o n s 11: n i c t ii :: ici t: :: b e g ii u e III t o 1: ti e a 1 1 e m p t I: o 
combine ihe separate e 1 i g i b i 1 11 y paragraphs :i s t h a t 1: li e w o i: d s 
.^eluding those injured prior to March, 6 1 94,9" were i ntended to 
• •-re i :) i n, j ii i: e ci p t i o i: t: o t la a, t ci a, t e w h o were enti tiled to 
benefits from the Special Fund and the only way anyone I rijured 
before Ma r c h, 6 19 4 9 c o u ] ci, qualify f o i: S p e c I a 1 F u, n ci p a i: t :i c i p a 11 o n 
was through the 1974 1 e g I s 1, a t, i o n M h :i :  li :i ci, e n t: i f :i e < 3 i:: e c :i p i e i:i„ t s a, s 
those "permanently and, total ly di sab] ed on or before March 5, 1 949lr 
c o mp e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s " m e a n i n g , o f c o u i: s e, o n 1 y t: h o s e e n t i 11 e ci, t o 
lifetime benefits under the Statutes applicable to their particular 
11 'i i u r y r t * s u 11 11 J < j i n I 11 * • l i i n, i in 111 i i1111 t o t a, 1 „ 3, I «,. 1111 I i I y 
Plaintiff believes that for this reason alone Applicant's 
claim,, shoul .d have been dismissed and that the Decision of the 
C o m m 1 s s 1 o n s h o i :i 1 ci, b e i: e v «•> i s«•> d. 
INCLUSION 
1 • ; ' M I ! ., iiiiuihi J, v , I 1 a I n l i f f 
v i g o r o u s 1 y a s s e r t s a nd b e l i e v e s o ^  y c ad q u e s t i o n: 
That neither the 1977 Amendment to Permanent Total 
Disability Statute (now Section 35-1-67 Utah Code Ann.) nor 
any other Amendment of the Permanent Total Disability 
Statute of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act was intended 
to create new lifetime increased benefits to Applicant 
Robert Seitz or to create a new 100% liability for those 
lifetime benefits in the Special Fund (now Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund* Plaintiff herein). Moreover, under 
recognized and accepted basic principles of statutory 
construction, considered in the light of previous 
Amendments to that Statute, particularly those in 1971, 
1973 and 1974 discussed in detail hereinabove, the 1977 
Amendment - considered as a whole with meaning accorded to 
all the pertinent language - cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as found by the Commission to entitle Applicant 
after almost 30 years - to lifetime benefits which were 
expressly denied to him under the Statute in effect at the 
time of his injury. For this reason alone - application of 
established principles of statutory construction - the 
Decision of the Industrial Commission should be reversed 
and Applicant's claim dismissed. 
As a matter of established Utah Workers1 Compensation Law, 
7 
the 197# Amendment, even if intended as the Commission 
majority held, cannot properly be applied to Applicant's 
1948 injury because it would create new and enlarged 
benefits in Applicant as well as a new 100% liability in 
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Plaint :;i £ f wti i c h l:i a d n o 1 i a b 1111 y a t a ] 1 u n d e r t h e S t a t u t e 
i n. e f f e c t a t t: h e cl a t e o f :i n j i i r y 
Und e r p r I o r d e c I s i o n s o f t ii e U t: a h S i i p i: e ine C o I 11: t: a • 3 we ] 1 a s 
t h o s e c: • f t h i s Cour t ( s e e ci I s c u s s Ion undeu Po i n t 11 , aII • o v e 
a nd c a s e s i: e f e i: i: e d t o t ti e ir e i n ) s u c h a n Ame nd me n t c a n n o t b e 
applied i n ] 977 1: o t h, i s A p p I i c a ii t a ii cl h i s 1 9 4 8 i n j i :i i: y 
3 . A s a f i nal poi nt, Plai ntif f a l s o beli eves that thJ s Court 
af ter 40 y ears does not hav e ji ;i r:i sd:i ct:i on to reopen a 1 948 
i n j u r y which was s u b j e c t to f Ina 1 0rder :i n 1 948 , whIch 
O r d e r wa s f u ] 1 y c o mp 11 e ci w i t ti a nd a ] ] c ompensation p o s s i b 1 e 
u n d e i: I: Ii e a p p 1 1 c a fa 1 e S t a 1: i :i t e p a :i ci ii in f i i ] Il 
For the reasons set forth, above, the Order of the 
Commission i n tl:iIs c:ase shou] ci be reversed and the c a s e remanded to 
t h e C o mm i s s i o n w i t h i n s 11: u c 11 o ri s f: • :) I) :i s m I s s A p p 1 :i c: a n t s • ::: II a i m f o r 
b e n e f i t s . , / 
DATED t h i s /w' d a y : f i^plembc-M 1 9 9 2 . 
U 
Administrator 
Employers• Reinsurance Fund 
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Chs. 64,65 Industrial Commission [136] 
test for syphilis, made not more than thirty days prior to the date of 
issuance of such license and that in the opinion of such physician and 
surgeon, the applicant either is not infected with syphilis or other ven-
ereal disease, or if so infected, is not in a stage of such disease which is 
or which may become communicable. 
40-1-20. Medical Certificate. 
The certificate and report shall be on a form to be provided 
and distributed by the state board of health to approved laboratories in 
the state. This form is referred to in this act as the certificate form, 
provided, however, that any certificate form which has been approved by 
the proper authority in any state requiring premarital examinations for 
venereal diseases shall be accepted in this state. 
Approved February 19,1945. 
DNDDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CHAPTER 65 
^ H. B. No. 6. (Passed February 21,1945.- In effect July 1,1945.) 
v* AMENDING SUNDRY SECTIONS OF TITLE 42, CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 
AND ADDING TWO SECTIONS 
An Act Amending Sections 42-1-17, 42-1-37, 42-l-39t 42-1-41, 42-1-44, 
42-1-58, 42-1-61, 42-1-62, 42-1-63, 42-1-64, 42-1-65, 42-1-69, 42-1-75 and 
42-1-83, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Relating to and Providing Work-
men's Compensation; Places of Employment to be Safe; Penalty for 
Failure to Furnish Information or Obey an Order of the Commission; 
Injunctions for Failure to Insure; Employees Defined; Right of Re-
covery from Third Persons for Wrongful Acts; Amounts of Compen-
sation Payable; Remarriage of Widow; Rehabilitation of Injured 
Employee; Artificial Appliances and Burial Expenses; Injuries to 
Minors; and Enacting New Sections to be Known as 42-1-57.10 and 
42-1-69,10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Relating to and Providing for 
Compensation in Case of Injury to Minors Illegally Employed, Penalty 
and Exclusive Remedy and Defining When Minor Awards Shall Cease; 
and Repealing Section 14-6-27, Utah Code Annotated 1943* 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
•••
 s$— Section 1. Sections Amended. 
iSfL£*t?^] Sections 42-1-17, 42-1-37, 42-1-39, 42-1-41, 42-1-44, 42-1-58, 42-1-61, 
| ^ i L « V ^ 42-1-62, 52-1-63, 42-1-64, 42-1-65, 42-1-69, 42-1-75 and 42-1-83, Utah 
IsSTtt-wi J* Code Annotated 1943, are amended to read: 
r | ^ 2 ^ J ! 3 • 42-1-17. Investigation^ Places of Employment. 
~~ ^ Upon complaint oy any person that any employment of place of employ-
ment, regaroless of the mimoer if persons emnioyed, is not safe or is 
injurious "o- zhe welfare of any emniovee, tne commission snail proceed, 
with or without notice, o^ matte hucn ^vesrigation as may be necessary 
[141] Industrial Commission Ch.65 
One thumb at the proximal joint .-. 30 weeks 
One thumb at the second or distal joint „ 20 weeks 
One first finger and the metacarpal bone thereof 30 weeks 
One first finger at the proximal joint - 20 weeks 
One first finger at the second joint 15 weeks 
One first finger at the distal joint 10 weeks 
One second finger and the metacarpal bone thereof 30 weeks 
One second finger at the proximal joint 15 weeks 
One second finger at the second joint 10 weeks 
One second finger at the distal joint 5 weeks 
One third finger and the metacarpal bone thereof . . . . 20 weeks 
One third finger at the proximal joint 12 weeks 
One third finger at the second joint 8 weeks 
One third finger at the distal joint . . . . . . . . . . 4 weeks 
One fourth finger and the metacarpal bone thereof. . . . . . . . 12 weeks 
One fourth finger at the proximal joint . . . . .
 c 9 weeks 
One fourth finger at the second joint . • 6 weeks 
One fourth finger at the distal joint . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 weeks 
One leg at or so near the hip joint as to preclude the use of an 
artificial limb 180 weeks 
One leg at or above the knee where stump remains sufficient to 
permit the use of an artificial limb . . 150 weeks 
One leg between the knee and the ankle. 140 weeks 
One foot at the ankle 125 weeks 
One great toe with the metatarsal bone thereof . 30 weeks 
One great toe at the proximal joint 15 weeks 
One great toe at the second joint 10 weeks 
One toe other than the great toe with the metatarsal bone 
thereof c 12 weeks 
One toe other than the great toe at the proximal joint 6" weeks 
One toe other than the great toe at the distal joint 3 weeks 
In the above cases permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed 
equivalent to loss of the member or part thereof. 
One eye by enucleation 120 weeks 
Total blindness of one eye 100 weeks 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not other-
wise provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission 
shall deem equitable and in proportion as near as may be to compensa-
tion for specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section, but not 
exceeding in any case two hundred weeks. , 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations 
as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, 
and in no event shall more than a total of $5,624.00 be required to be paid. 
42-1-63. Compensation for Permanent Total Disability. 
In cases of permanent total disability, the award shall be 60 per cent 
of the average weekly wages for five years from date of injury, and 
thereafter 45 per cent of such average weekly wages but not to exceed a 
ma-rfTTin-m oi S22.30 per week, plus 5 per cent: af such award for each 
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dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum 
of five such dependent minor children, and not less than $10.00 per 
week, 'provided, however, that in no case of permanent total disability 
shall more than $8,500.00 be required to be paid. The loss, or permanent 
and complete loss of use, of both hands or both arms, or both feet or both 
legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall constitute total and perma-
nent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of this 
section. 
• - In case the permanent total disability begins after a period of tem-
porary total disability, the period of temporary disability shall be de-
ducted from the total period of compensation. 
42-1-64. Compensation for Death. 
In case injury causes death within the period of three years, the em-
ployer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased 
as provided herein, and further benefits in the amounts and to the per-
sons as follows: 
(1) If there are no dependents, the employer and insurance carrier 
shall pay into the state treasury a sum equal to 20 per cent of the amount 
provided in subdivision (2) of this section. Any claim for compensation 
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of the 
death of the deceased, and, if at the end of one year from the date of 
the death of the deceased no claim for compensation shall have been filed 
with the commission, the payment of a sum equal to 20-per cent of the 
amount provided in subdivision (2) of this section shall be paid at that 
time into the state treasury.by the employer or the insurance carrier. 
Such payment shall be held in a special fund for the purposes provided 
in sections 42-1-65 and 42-1-66; the state treasurer shall be the custodian 
of such special fund, and the commission shall direct the distribution 
thereof. 
: (2) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, 
the payment shall be 60 per cent of the average weekly wage, but not to 
exceed a maximum of $22.50 per week to continue for the remainder of 
the period between the date of the death and not to exceed six years 
after the date- of the injury, and shall not amount to more than a maxi-
mum of $7,000.00 or less than a minimum of $2,000. 
: (3) If there are partly dependent persons at the. time of the death, 
the payment shall be 60 per cent of the average weekly wages, but not 
to exceed the maximum of $22.50 per week, to continue for all or such 
portion of the period of six years after the date of injury as the com-
mission in" each case may determine, and shall not amount to more than 
a maximum of $5,000. The benefits provided for in this subdivision shall 
be in keeping with the-'circumstances and conditions of dependency 
existing at the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the commis-
sion under this subdivision must be consistent with the general pro-
visions of this title/, .W>""v .i-r . : - • ; .. . _
 ; i 
(4) If there are'wholly, dependent persons and also partially depend-
ent persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion" the 
benefits as it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits 
EXHIBIT "B" 
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CHAPTER 51 
S. B. No. 43. 
(Passed February 23, 1930. In effect May 9,1939.) 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION—STATE 
INSURANCE FUND 
An Act Amending Sections 42-1-2, 42-1-5, 
42-1-27, 42-1-30, 42-1-31, 42-1-34, 42-1-36, 
42-1-37, 42-1-38, 42-1-39, 42-1-40, 42-1-41, 
42-1-44, 42-1-46, 42-1-47, 42-1-49, 42-1-53, 
42-1-54, 42-1-58, 42-1-67, 42-1-90, 42-1-91, 
42-1-92, 42-1-93, 42-1-95, 42-2-1, 42-2-3, 
42-2-5, 42-2-7, 42-2-11, 42-2-16 and 42-2-17 
of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and 
Sections 42-1-61, 42-1-62, 42-1-63, 42-1-64 
and 42-1-69 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, as Amended by Chapter 41, Laws of 
Utah, 1937; and Enacting a New Section to 
Be Known as Section 42-1-97A, Relating to 
Industrial Commission, Workmen's Compensa-
tion and the State Insurance Fund. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of 
Utah: 
Section 1. Sections Amended and Enacted. 
Sections 42-1-2, 42-1-5, 42-1-27, 42-1-30, 
42-1-31, 42-1-34, 42-1-36, 42-1-37, 42-1-38, 42-1-39, 
42-1-40, 42-1-41, 42-1-44, 42-1-46, 42-1-47, 
42-1-49,42-1-53, 42-1-54, 42-1-58, 42-1-67, 42-1-90, 
42-1-91, 42-1-92, 42-1-93, 42-1-95, 42-2-1, 42^2-3, 
42-2-5, 42-2-7, 42-2-11, 42-2-16 and 42-2-17 of the 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and Sections 
42-1-61, 42-1-62, 42-1-63, 42-1-64 and 42-1-69 of 
the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended 
by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1937, are amended 
and Section 42-1-97A is enacted to read: 
42-1-2. Actions by and Against—Service of 
Process on. 
By its name "The Industrial Commission of 
Utah" said commission may sue and be sued. 
Service of summons or other process on any 
member of the commission, or on the secretary 
thereof, shall be deemed service on the commis-
sion. 
42-1-3. Salary of Members—Oaths—Bonds. 
Each commissioner shall receive an annual 
salary of $4,000, payable as are other state offi-
cers. Before entering upon the duties of his 
office he shall take and subscribe the constitu-
tional oath of office, and file the same in the of-
fice of the secretary of state. Each member of 
the commission shall give a corporate surety 
bond in the sum of $10,000. All employees of the 
commission receiving or disbursing funds of the 
state shall give corporate surety bonds to :he 
state in amounts and with sureties co be approved 
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by the commission. The bond premiums shall be 
paid by the state. 
42-1-27. Depositions. 
The commission or any party may in any in-
vestigation cause depositions of witnesses resid-
ing within or without the state to be taken as in 
civil actions. 
42-1-30. Prosecutors on Behalf of Commission. 
The commission may direct a representative 
to act as special prosecutor or to defend in any 
suit, action, proceeding, investigation, hearing or 
trial relating to matters within or concerning its 
jurisdiction. Upon the request of the commis-
sion, the attorney-general, district attorney or 
the county attorney of the county in which any 
investigation, hearing or trial had under the pro-
visions of this title is pending, shall aid therein 
and prosecute, under the supervision of the com-
mission, all necessary actions or proceedings for 
the enforcement of this title. 
42-1-31. Orders Not to Be Set Aside on 
Technicalities. 
A substantial compliance with the require-
ments of this title shall be sufficient to give 
effect to the orders of the commission, and they 
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void 
for any omission of a technical nature. 
42-1-34. Actions, to Set Aside Orders—Ex-
clusive Jurisdiction of Supreme and 
District Courts. 
No court, except the district court and the 
supreme court shall have jurisdiction to review, 
vacate, set aside, reverse, revise, correct, amend 
or annul any order of the commission requiring 
protection of life, health, safety or welfare1 of 
employees in any employment or places of em-
ployment, or to suspend or delay the execution 
or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or 
interfere with the commission in the performance 
of its official duties. 
42-1-36. Proceedings Preferred on Trial 
Calendars. 
All actions and proceedings under this title, 
and all actions or proceedings to which the com-
mission or the state may be a party, in which 
any question arises under this title, or under or 
concerning any order of the commission, shall 
be advanced for trial or hearing over all other 
civil causes, except election and public utility 
causes, irresDective of position on the calendar. 
The same preference shall be granted noon ao-
dication of the commission m any action or pro-
ceeding in wnich it may oe allowed to intervene. 
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of five such dependent minor children, or $20 
per week, to be paid weekly for the periods stated 
against such injuries respectively, and shall be in 
addition to the compensation hereinbefore pro-
vided for temporary total disability, to wit: 
•; For loss of: 
One arm at or near shoulder ... .200 weeks 
One arm at the elbow ....... .... 180 weeks 
One arm between the wrist and the 
elbow 160 weeks 
bne hand .150 weeks 
One thumb and the metacarpal bone 
thereof 60 weeks 
One thumb at the proximal joint 30 weeks 
One thumb at the second or distal joint 20 weeks 
One first finger and the metacarpal 
- bone thereof 30 weeks 
One first finger at the proximal joint.. 20 weeks 
One first finger at the second joint 15 weeks 
One first finger at the distal joint........ 10 weeks 
One second finger and the metacarpal 
bone thereof ....................................... 30 weeks 
One second finger at the proximal 
joint . ............. .............. 15 weeks 
One second finger at the second joint.. 10 weeks 
One second finger at the distal joint.. 5 weeks 
One third finger and the metacarpal 
- bone thereof 20 weeks 
,One third finger at the proximal joint 12 weeks 
One third finger at the second joint 8 weeks 
One third finger at the distal joint...! 4 weeks 
. One fourth finger and the metacarpal 
- bone thereof . . _ 12 weeks 
One fourth finger at the proximal 
joint ... , 9 weeks 
One fourth finger at the second joint. 6 weeks 
One fourth finger at the distal joint 3 weeks 
One leg at or so near the hip joint as 
to preclude the use of an artificial 
limb .... ......._......180 weeks 
One leg at or above the knee where 
stump remains sufficient to per-
mit the use of an artificial limb.....„..150 weeks 
One leg between the knee and ankle....!40 weeks 
- One foot at the ankle . ....125 weeks 
One great toe with the metatarsal 
bone thereof ......... 30 weeks 
One great toe at the proximal joint... 15 weeks 
One great toe at the second joint....... 10 weeks 
One toe other than the great toe with 
the metatarsal bone thereof . ... 12 weeks 
One toe other than the great toe at 
the proximal joint .. 6 weeks 
One toe other than the great toe at the 
distal joint ................ . 3 weeks 
In the above cases permanent and complete 
loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of 
the member or part thereof. 
One eye by enucleation. 120 weeks 
Total blindness of one eye 100 weeks 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of 
bodily function not otherwise provided for here-
in, such period of compensation as the commis-
sion shall deem equitable and in proportion to 
compensation in other cases, not exceeding two 
hundred weeks. 
The amounts specified in this section are all 
subject to the limitations as to the maximum 
' weekly amount payable as specified in this sec-
tion, and in no event shall more than a total of 
$6,250 be required to be paid. 
42-1-63. Compensation for Permanent Total 
Disability. 
In cases of permanent total disability, the 
award shall be 60 per cent of the average weekly 
wages for five yeara from date of injury, and 
thereafter 45 per cent of such average weekly 
wages until the death of such person so totally 
disabled, but not to exceed a maximum of $16 
per week, plus 5 per cent of such award for 
each dependent minor child under the age of 
eighteen years, up to a maximum of five such 
dependent minor children, and not less than $7 
per week. The loss, or permanent and complete 
loss of use. of both hands or both arms, or both 
feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two 
thereof, shall constitute total and permanent dis-
ability, to be compensated according to the pro-
visions of this section. 
42-1-64. Compensation for Death. 
In case injury causes death within the period 
of three years, the employer or insurance carrier 
shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as 
provided herein, and further benefits in the 
amounts and to the persons as follows: 
(1) If there are no dependents, the employer 
and insurance carrier shall pay into the state 
treasury a sum equal to 20 per cent of the amount 
provided in subdivision (2) of this section. Any 
claim for compensation must be filed with the 
commission within one year from the date of 
the death of the deceased, and, if at the end of 
one year from the date of the death of the de-
ceased no claim for compensation shall have been 
filed with the commission, the payment of a sum 
equal to 20 per cent of the amount provided in 
subdivision (2) of this section shall be paid at 
that time into the state treasury by the employer 
or the insurance carrier. Such payment shall be 
held in a special fund for the purposes provided 
in sections 42-1-65 and 42-1-66; the state treas-
urer shall be the custodian of 3uch special fund, 
and the commission shall direct the distribution 
thereof. 
(2) If there are wholly dependent persons at 
the time of the death, the payment shall be 60 
per cent of the average weekly wage, but sot to 
exceed a maximum of $16 per week, plus 10 per 
cent of said award for each dependent minor 
child under the age of eighteen years, up to and 
including five such dependent minor children, to 
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42-1-65, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. 
IV. The benefits imposed upon the employer and to which an employee 
found, as in this section above provided, to be partially permanently dis-
abled, shall be entitled under this act, are limited to the following: 
During those weeks in which the employee is actively in training under 
the division of rehabilitation, as in this section above referred to, the 
employee shall receive §25.00 per week for not to exceed 10 weeks, or a 
total of §250.00, such payment to be made at four-week intervals and 
upon the filing with the commission at two-week intervals of a certifi-
cate by the division of rehabilitation that the employee is cooperating with 
such division in his rehabilitation training. 
At the termination of such training in rehabilitation, the employee 
shall be paid §12.50 a week at four-week intervals until such time as the 
total payments so made, plus the weekly payments received by the em-
ployee during rehabilitation training, equals a sum equivalent to that 
amount determined under the following formula: 
By applying the percentage of partial permanent disability resulting 
from the occupational disease and determined by the medical panel (or 
in case of formal hearing, then by the commission) to the amount of 
§3000.00. For example: Assume a finding by the medical panel that the 
employee has sustained partial permanent disability from an occupa-
tional disease to the extent of 20 fo loss of bodily function. 20fo of 
$3000.00 equals §600.00. The amount payable would therefore be: 
10 weeks rehabilitation §250.00 
Balance at intervals of 4 weeks 350.00 
TOTAL §600.00 
Notwithstanding anything hereinabove provided, payments for par-
tial permanent disability shall not exceed in any one case an aggregate of 
Three Thousand Dollars (§3000.00) and all payments so made shall be 
credited to the employer and deducted from any award which might 
ultimately be made should the employee subsequently become totally and 
permanently disabled. 
Section 3. Section Repealed. 
Sec. 42-1A-25, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by chapter 66, 
Laws of Utah 1945, is repealed. 
Section 4. Effective Date. 
This act shall take effect upon approval. 
Approved March 5, 1949. 
CHAPTER 52 
5. B. No. 2S9. (Passed February 28,1949. In effect Marca 5,1949.) 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
in Act Amending Section 42-1-40, 42-1-57, 42-1-79, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943; 42-1-41, 42-1-44, 42-1-61, 42-1-62, -42-1-63, 42-1-64 and 
42-1-75, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as Amended by Chapter 65, Laws 
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One third finger at the distal joint 4 weeks 
One fourth finger and the metacarpal bone thereof 12 weeks 
One fourth finger at the proximal joint 9 weeks 
One fourth finger at the second joint 6 weeks 
One fourth finger at the distal joint 3 weeks 
One leg at or near the hip joint as to preclude the use of 
an artificial limb 180 weeks 
One leg at or above the knee where stump remains suffici-
ent to permit the use of an artificial limb 150 weeks 
One leg between the knee and ankle 140 weeks 
One foot at the ankle 125 weeks 
One great toe with the metatarsal bone thereof 30 weeks 
One great toe at the proximal joint 15 weeks 
One great toe at the second joint 10 weeks 
One toe other than the great toe with the metatarsal bone 
thereof . 12 weeks 
One toe other than the great toe at the proximal joint 6 weeks 
One toe other than the great toe at the distal joint 3 weeks 
In the above cases permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed 
equivalent to loss of the member or part thereof. 
One eye by enucleation 120 weeks 
Total blindness of one eye" 100 weeks 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not other-
wise provided fcr herein, such period of compensation as the commission 
shall deem equitable andl in proportion as near as may be to compensa-
tion for specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not 
exceeding in any case two hundred weeks. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations 
as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, 
and in no event shall more than a total of $6250.00 be required to be paid. 
42-1-63- Id. For Permanent Total Disability. 
In cases of permanent total disability the award shall be 60% of the 
average weekly stages for five years from date of injury, and thereafter 
45% of such average weekly wages, but not to exceed a maximum of 
$25*00 per week and not less than $15.00 per week, plus 5% of such award 
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years up to a 
maximum of 5 such dependent minor children; provided however, that 
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay more than $11,000.00; and provided further, 
that a finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceed-
ings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently 
and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission 
of Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation 
under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it 
shall be the duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational re-
habilitation division, out of that special fund provided for by section 
42-1-64, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, subdivision 1, not to 
exceed $520.00 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such em-
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ployee; the rehabilitation and training: of such employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under section 42-1-65, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943, as amended, and relating to the rehabilitation of employees 
having combined injuries. If and when the division of vocational re-
habilitation under the state board of education certifies to the industrial 
commission of Utah in writing that such employee has fully cooperated 
with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate 
him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not be rehabl-
itated, then the commission shall order that there be paid to such em-
ployee weekly benefits at the rate of 45% of his average weekly earnings, 
but not to exceed $25.00 per week, out of that special fund provided for 
by section 42-1-64, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, for such 
period of time beginning with the time that the payments (as in* this 
section provided) to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier 
terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No employee, 
however, shall be entitled to any such payments if he fails or refuses to 
cooperate with the division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth 
herein. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of 
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial com-
mission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and there-
upon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an op-
portunity to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwith-
standing such rehabilitation, sustained' a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both*feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according: 
to the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent 
total disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, 
hcnoever, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where 
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial 
permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer be required to pay compensation for an}' 
combination of disabilities of any kind including loss of function, in 
excess of ?11,000.00. 
42-1-64. Id. Death. 
In case injury causes death within the period of three years, the em-
ployer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the de-
ceased as provided herein, and further benefits in the amounts and to 
the persons as follows: 
(1) If there are no dependents, the employer and insurance carrier 
shall pay into the state treasury the sum of Eighteen Hundred Dollars. 
Any claim for compensation must be filed with the commission within 
one year from the date of the death of the deceased, and, if at the end of 
one year from the date of the death of the deceased no claim for compen-
sation shall have been filed with the comntission, the said sum of Eighteen 
Hundred Dollars shall be paid at that rane into the state treasury by 
the employer or the insurance c^«ie*r Such payment shall be held in a 
special fund for the purposes%rovided in this title; the state treasurer 
EXHIBIT "D" 
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CHAPTER 76 
S. B. No. 242 (Passed March 10, 197! In effect July 1, 1971) 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
An Act Amending Sections 35-1-5 and 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, Section 35-1-53, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by 
Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66, 35-1-67, and 
35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 57, Laws 
of Utah 1955, as Amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as 
Amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as Amended by Chapter 
71, Laws of Utah 1961, as Amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 
1963, as Amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as Amended by 
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 1967, as Amended by Chapter 86, Laws of 
Utah 1969, Section 35-1-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended 
by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, and Section 35-1-81, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 57, Laws of Utah 1955, as 
Amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as Amended by Chapter 
68, Laws of Utah 1965, as Amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 
1969, Repealing and Reenacting Section 35-1-75, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, and Repealing Section 35-1-61, Utah Code Annotated 
1953; Relating to Workmen's Compensation; Deleting the Provision 
Relating to Compensation of Commissioners; Deleting the Additional 
Tax on Employers Authorized to Pay Compensation Direct; Establish-
ing the Amounts to be Paid by Every County, City, Town, or School 
District Which Elects to Pay Compensation Direct; Providing for the 
Deduction of Costs and Attorney's Fees From the Person Paying Com-
pensation Upon Recovery From a Third Person; Providing Increased 
Benefits; Establishing the Period of Compensation for Permanent Total 
Loss of Bodily Function; Providing Additional Compensation for Per-
sons Totally and Permanently Disabled Who Are Receiving Benefits 
From the Special Fund; Providing for the Protecting of Payments to 
Minor Dependents; Providing a New Method of Determining Average 
Weekly Wage; Repealing the Penalty for Illegal Employment of 
Minors; Providing an Effective Date. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read: 
35-1-5. Commissioner to take oath of office and give a corporate surety 
bond. 
Each commissioner, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall 
take and subscribe the constitutional oath of office, and file the same 
in the office of the secretary of state. Each member of the commission 
shall give a corporate surety bond in such amount and in such form as 
shell [shall] be determined by the department of finance. All employees 
of the commission receiving or disbursing funds of the state shall give 
corporate surety bonds to the state in such amount and in such form as 
snail be determined by the department oi finance. The bond premiums 
shall be paid by the state. 
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than industrial conditions. 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical 
professions appointed by the commission shall measure the loss in each 
eai at the three frequencies 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second which 
shall be added together and divided by three to determine the average 
decibel loss. To allow for presbycusis, there shall be deducted from the 
'average decibel loss % of decibel for each year of the employee's age 
over forty at the time of the accident: To determine the percentage of 
hearing loss in each ear, (after deduction of the loss in decibels for pres-
bycusis) the average decibel loss for each decibel of loss exceeding fif-
teen decibels shall be multiplied by 1%% up to the maximum of 100% 
which is reached at 82 decibels. 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of 
hearing loss in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of 
hearing loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resultant figure 
is the percentage of binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent 
partial disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multi-
plying the percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of compen-
sation benefits as provided in this chapter* Where an employee files one 
or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously 
found,to exist shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the com-
mission. In no event shall compensation benefits be paid for total or 
100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation bene-
fits. 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not other-
wise provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission 
shall deem equitable and in proportion as near as may be to compensa-
tion for specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not 
exceeding in any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period 
of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations 
as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, 
and in no event shall more than a total of 312 weeks in compensation 
be required to be paid* 
Section 6. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 
57, Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, 
as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 
71, Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, 
as amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 
65, Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, 
is amended to read: 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability benefits—Vocational rehabilitation 
—Maximum benefit, 
In cases of permanent total disability the award shall be 60% of the 
average weekly wages for five years from date of injury, and thereafter 
45% of such average weekly wages, but not to exceed a maximum of $54 
per week and not less than $29 per week, plus $5 for a dependent wife 
and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children; provided, however, that 
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in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay more than $24,648; and provided further, that 
a finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceed-
ings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and 
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation 
under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall 
be the duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabili-
tation division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68, 
not to exceed S890 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such em-
ployee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the 
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that such em-
ployee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation 
in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that 
there-be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 45% of 
his average weekly earnings, but not to exceed $54 per week, out of that 
special fund provided for by section 35-1-68, for such period of time be-
ginning with the time that the payments (as in this section provided) 
to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and end-
ing with the death of the employee. No employee, however, shall be en-
titled to any such payments if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the 
division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein. 
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and now receiving compensation benefits from the special fund 
provided for by section 35-1-68 shall be paid compensation benefits at 
the rate of $44 per week This section shall apply to all persons perma-
nently and totally disabled who are now receiving or hereafter become 
entitled to receive compensation benefits from the special fund. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of 
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commis-
sion of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and there-
upon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an oppor-
tunity to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding 
such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according 
to the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent 
total disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, 
however, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where 
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon par-
tial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer be required to pay compensation for any 
combination ox disabilities of any kind including loss of function, in 
excess of 524.348. 
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Section 1. Section amended. 
Sectioi i '!; i 1 16, \ Ital i Code V mot a.ted 1953, is amended to i sad: 
35-1 16, Powers and duties of the industrial commission. 
It shall be the duty of the commission, and it shall have full, power, 
jurisdiction and authority: 
(1) To supervise every employment and place of employment and to 
administer and enforce all laws for the protection of the life, health, safety 
and welfare of employees. 
(2) To ascertain and fix such reasonable standards, and prescribe, 
modify and enforce such reasonable orders, for the adoption of safety de-
vices, safeguards and other means or methods of protection, to be as 
nearly uniform as possible, as may be necessary to carry out all laws and 
lawful orders relative to the protection of the life, health, safety and 
welfare of employees in employment and places of employment. 
(3) To ascertain, fix and order such reasonable standards for the 
construction, repair and maintenance of places of employment as shall 
render them safe. 
(4) To investigate, ascertain and determine such reasonable classifi-
cations of persons, employments and places of employment as shall be 
necessary to carry out the purposes of this title. 
(5) To promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation 
of disputes between employers and employees. 
(6) To establish and conduct free employment agencies, and to license, 
supervise and regulate private employment offices, and to bring together 
employers seeking employees and working people seeking employment,, 
and to make known the opportunities for employment in this state. 
(7) To collect, collate and publish statistical and other information 
relating to employees, employers, employments and places of employment 
and such other statistics as it may deem proper. 
(8) To ascertain and adopt reasonable standards and regulations, to 
proscribe and enforce reasonable orders, and to take such other actions 
as may be appropriate for the protection of life, health, safety and welfare 
of all persons with respect to all prospects, tunnels, pits, banks, open cut 
workings, quarries, strip mine operations, ore mills and surface operations 
or any olher mining operation, whether or not the relationship of em-
ployer and employee exists. 
Approved March 15, 1973. 
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
An Aci VifTiei-K ling: Section, 35-1 84, 1 Jtah Code Annotated 1953, as Amend-
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ed by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1961, as Amended by Chapter 68, Laws 
of Utah 1965, Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66, 35-1-67, and 35-1-68, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 57, Laws of Utah 1955, as 
Amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as Amended by Chapter S5, 
Laws of Utah 1959, as Amended by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1961, as 
Amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as Amended by Chapter 68, 
Laws of Utah 1965, as Amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 1967, as 
Amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as Amended by Chapter 76, 
Laws of Utah 1971, Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
Amended by Chapter 57, Laws of Utah 1955, as Amended by Chapter 62, 
Laws of Utah 1957, as Amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as 
Amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as Amended by Chapter 68, 
Laws of Utah 1965, as Amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, Sec-
tion 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 76, 
Laws of Utah 1971, and Section 35-1-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
Amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as Amended by Chapter 76, 
Laws of Utah 1971;'Relating to Workmen's Compensation; Reducing the 
Waiting Period for Benefits; Providing Increased Benefits Based Upon 
State Average Weekly Wage; Defining State Average Weekly Wage; 
Extending the Time Within Which to File Claim for Compensation; Ex-
tending Statutes of Limitation; Increasing the Credit of Social Security 
Against Compensation payments; providing Increased Payments for 
Rehabilitation; Providing for maximum Attorneys' Fees Payable by Em-
ployers or Their Carriers in, and for Notice to those Persons Prior to, any 
Action Against a Third Party; Limiting Widows1 Lump Sum Benefits; 
and Providing an Effective Date. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-64, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 71, 
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, is amen-
ded to read: 
35-1-64. Waiting period for benefits. 
No. compensation shall be allowed for the first three days after the injury 
is received, except the disbursements hereinafter authorized for medical, 
nurse and hospital services, and for medicines and funeral expenses, 
provided, however, if the period of total temporary disability lasts more 
than 14 days, compensation shall also be payable for the first three days af-
ter the injury is received. 
Section 2. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-65, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57 
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as amen 
ded by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959^ as amended by Chapter 71, Laws o 
Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as amended b} 
Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utal 
1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as amended by Chap 
ter 76, Laws of Utah 1971* is amended to read: 
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at the three frequencies 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second which shall be 
added together and divided by three to determine the average decibel loss. 
To allow for presbycusis, there shall be deducted from the average decibel 
loss 1/2 a decibel for each year of the employee's age over forty at the time 
of the accident; To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, (af-
ter deduction of the loss in decibels for presbycusis) the average decibel loss 
for each decibel of loss exceeding fifteen decibels shall be multiplied by 1-
1/2% up to the maximum of 100% which is reached at 82 decibels. 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of 
hearing loss in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing 
loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is the per-
centage of binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent partial 
disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the 
percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits 
as provided in this chapter. Where an employee files one or more claims for 
hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist shall be 
deducted from any subsequent aware by the commission. In no event shall 
compensation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss ex-
ceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits. 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise 
provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission shall 
deem equitable and in proporation as near as may be to compensation for 
specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in 
any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation 
for permanent total loss of bodily function. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as 
to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and in 
no event shall more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be 
required to be paid. 
Section 4 Section amended. 
Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57, 
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as amen-
ded by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 71, Laws of 
Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as amended by 
Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 
1967, as amended by Chapter 86y Laws of Utah 1969, as amended by Chap-
ter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, is amended to read: 
35-1 67 Permanent total disability— Limitation of weekly com-
pensation—Referral procedures to division of vocational rehabil-
itation—-Partial permanent disability— Statutes of limitations. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66-2/3% 
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the in-
jury per week and not less than a minimum of $35 per week plus $5 for a 
dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 
years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not to 
exceed 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
p e r Week. However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the em-
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ployer or its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation 
payments for more than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by 
the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative 
and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been tound to be permanently ana 
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under 
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the 
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation 
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), not to 
exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee; 
the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally follow the 
practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the rehabilitation 
of employees having combined injuries. If and when the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the 
industrial commission of Utah and in writing that such employee has fully 
co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to 
rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not be 
rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that there be paid to such em-
ployee weekly benefits at the rate of 66-2/3% of his average weekly wages at 
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a 
minimum of $35 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for each 
dependent*minor child under the age of IS years, up to a maximum of four 
such dependent minor children, but not to exceed 66-2/3% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out of that special 
fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning 
with the time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by 
the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of 
the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits 
if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational 
rehabilitation as set forth herein. 
Commencing July lf 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall be 
paid compensation benefits at the rate of $50 per week. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the 
vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of 
Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the com-
mission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, 
determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, 
sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both ar-
ms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall con-
stitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the 
provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total 
disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, however, 
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent 
disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in 
sections 35-1-65. 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function , in ex-
[1851 Labor Ch.67 
cess of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week for 312 weeks. 
Section 5. Section amended. 
Section 354.53^ Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 5 7, 
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as amen-
ded by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 71, Laws of 
Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as amended by 
Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 
1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as amended by Chap-
ter 78 L«i *vs of Utah 1971, is amended to read: 
35-1-68. Death benefits—Dependents— Special fund. 
In case injury causes death within the period of six years from the date of 
the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses 
of the deceased as provided herein, and further benefits in the amounts and 
to the persons as follows: 
(1) If there are no dependents, the employer and insurance carrier shall 
pay into the state treasury the sum of $15,600. Any claim for compensation 
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of death of 
the deceased, and, i»f at the end of one year from the date of death of the 
deceased, no claim for compensation shall have been filed with the com-
mission, the said sum of $15,600 shall be paid at that time into the state 
treasury by the employer or the insurance carrier. This payment shall be 
reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or 
due the deceased between the date of the accident and his death. Such 
payment shall be held in a special fund for the purposes provided in this 
title; the state treasurer shall be the custodian of such special fund, and the 
commission shall direct the distribution thereof. 
(2) If there are wholly dependent-persons at the time of the death, the 
payment shall be 66-2/3% of the 'decedent's average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum 
of $35 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent 
minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such depen-
dent minor children, but not to exceed 66-2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week, to continue during dependency for 
the remainder of the period between the date of the death and not to exceed 
six years-or 312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(3) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, the 
payment shall be 66-2/3% of the decedent's average weekly wages at the 
time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a 
minimum of $35 per week, to continue during dependency for the remainder 
of the period between the date of death and not to exceed six years or 312 
weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each case may determine 
and shall not amount to more than a maximum of $15,600. The benefits 
provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the circumstances 
and conditions of dependency existing at the date of injury, and any amount 
awarded by the commission under this subsection must be consistent with 
the general provisions of this cide. 
EXHIBIT "F 
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CHAPTER 13 
S. B. No. 3 (Passed February lf 1974. In effect April 4, 1974) 
BENEFITS FOR PERSONS PERMANENTLY 
DISABLED BEFORE 1949 
An Act Amending Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amend-
ed by Chapter 57, Laws of Utah 1955, as Amended by Chapter 62, Laws 
of Utah 1957, as Amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as Amend-
ed by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1961, as Amended by Chapter 49, 
Laws of Utah 1963, as Amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as 
Amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 1967, as Amended by Chapter 
86, Laws of Utah 1969, as Amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, 
as Amended by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1973, Relating to Permanent 
and Total Disability Benefits Under Workmen's Compensation; Pro-
viding for Payment of $50 per Week to Such Persons Regardless of 
When Such Disability Occurred. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 
57, Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, 
as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 
71, Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, 
as amended by Chapter 68t Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 
65, Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, 
as amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, as amended by Chapter 
67, Laws of Utah 1973, is amended to read: 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability benefits. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66 
2/3% of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more 
than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $35 per week 
plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under 
the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children, but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury per week However, in no case of permanent total 
disability shall the employer or its insurance carrier be required to pay such 
weekly compensation payments for more than 312 weeks; and provided 
further, that a finding by the commission of permanent total disability 
shall in all cases be tentative and not iinai until such time as the following 
proceedings have been nad: 
Where the employee has Tentatively 3een ;ouna co oe uermanentiv and 
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totally disabled, it shall be manditory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation 
under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and It sLall 
be the duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilita-
tion division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), 
not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such 
employee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the 
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah and in writing that such 
employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilita-
tion in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division 
the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order 
that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66 2/3% 
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than 
a maximum of 66 2/3 % of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $35 per week plus 
$5 for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the 
age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, 
but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week out of that special fund provided for by section 35-
1-63(1), for such period of time beginning with the time that the pay-
ments (as in this section provided) to be made by the employer or its 
insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee. 
No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails 
or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabilitation as 
set forth herein. 
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1) shall 
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $50 per week. 
Commencing July 1,1974, all persons who were permanently and totally 
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation 
benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1) at a 
rate sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $50 when combined with 
employer or insurance carrier compensation payments. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, \at Jhe termination of 
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commis-
sion of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon 
the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity 
to be heard, determine whether the empio3/ee ha^ notwithstanding such 
rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function!' 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of ase of both hands or both 
[35] Labor - Industrial Commission Ch. 13 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to 
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total 
disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, however, 
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent 
disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to 
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as pro-
vided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of func-
tion, in excess of 66 2/3 % of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week for 312 weeks. 
Approved February 8, 1974. 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 14 
H. B. No. 3 (Passed February 2, 1974. In effect April 4, 1974) 
REGISTRATION FEES ON FARM TRUCKS 
An Act Amending Section 41-1-127, Utah Code Annotated 1953, As En-
acted by Chapter 66, Laws of Utah 1955, as Amended by Chapter 62, 
Laws of Utah 1959, as Amended by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1963, as 
Amended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1973; Relating to Registra-
tion Fees for Motor Vehicles, Providing for a Separate Schedule of 
Registration Fees for Farm Trucks, 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 41-1-127, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 
66, Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1959, 
as amended by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1963, as amended by Chapter 
75, Laws of Utah 1973, is amended to read: 
41-1-127, Registration fees—Schedule. 
There shall be paid to the department for the registration of every 
motor vehicle, combination of vehicles, trailer or semitrailer, at the time 
application is made for registration: 
(a) A registration fee :>i 32.50 for :he registration of every motor-
cycle or trailer of 750 oounas or :ess uniaaen *veignt. 
'b) A registration ;ee )r 35.00 .or iie registration or -every iiotor 
EXHIBIT "G 
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If any deduction is made from the wages paid, the employer shall, either 
semimonthly or monthly at the employer's option, furnish the employee 
with a statement showing the total amount of each deduction, provided that 
only one total need be shown to include all standing deductions of fixed 
amounts, unless otherwise agreed by employer and employee. 
Approved March 19, 1977. 
CHAPTER 156 
H. B. No. 297 (Passed March 10, 1977. In effect May 10, 1977) 
AMENDMENTS TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 35-1-7, 35-1-41 AND 35-1-56, UTAH CODE. 
ANNOTATED 1953, SECTION 35-1-83, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 67, LAWS OF UTAH 1965, SECTION 35-1-74, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 57, LAWS OF UTAH 1955, AS 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 55, LAWS OF UTAH 1959, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
71, LAWS OF UTAH 1961, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 49, LAWS OF UTAH 1963, 
AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 68, I<AWS OF UTAH 1965, SECTION 35-1-46, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 86, LAWS OF UTAH 1969, 
SECTION 35-1-75, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 76, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1971, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 101, LAWS OF UTAH 1975, 
SECTION 35-1-66, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
57, LAWS OF UTAH 1955, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 62, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, 
AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 55, LAWS OF UTAH 1959, AS AMENDED BY 
CHAPTER 71, LAWS OF UTAH 1961, AS AMENDED. BY CHAPTER 49, LAWS OF 
UTAH 1963, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 68, LAWS OF UTAH 1965, AS AMENDED 
BY CHAPTER 65, LAWS OF UTAH 1967, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 86, LAWS OF 
UTAH 1969, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 76, LAWS OF UTAH 1971, AS AMENDED 
BY CHAPTER 67, LAWS OF UTAH 1973, SECTION 35-1-67, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 57, LAWS OF UTAH 1955, AS 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 62, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
55, LAWS OF UTAH 1959, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 71, LAWS OF UTAH 1961, 
AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 49, LAWS OF UTAH 1963, AS AMENDED BY 
CHAPTER 68, LAWS OF UTAH 1965, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 65, LAWS OF 
UTAH 1967, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 86, LAWS OF UTAH 1969, AS AMENDED 
BY CHAPTER 76, LAWS OF UTAH 1971, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 67, LAWS OF 
UTAH 1973, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 13, LAWS OF UTAH 1974, AS AMENDED 
BY CHAPTER 101, LAWS OF UTAH 1975, SECTION 35-1-68, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 57, LAWS OF UTAH 1955, AS 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 62, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, A3 AMENDED 3Y CHAPTER 
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1959, AS AMENDED 3Y CHAPTER ~1, LAWS OF UTAH 1361, 
AS AMENDED 3Y J H A P ^ R % ^ A W S 3F 'JTAH s963, iS T E N D E D 3Y 
CHAPTER S3. LAWS I F UTAH .365, *S AMENDED 3Y JHAPT2R ^5. L^WS OF 
fJTAH ,967. AS AMENDED 6Y CHAPTER S6. ,JAWS OF TJTAH :269. AS AMENDED 
3Y CHAPTER 76, Z ^ ^ S OF 'JTAH ,371. ^ S ^MENDED BY CHAPTER 67. L A W S OF 
JTAH 973. AS AMENDED 3Y JIIAPTSR 91. ^AWS ")F JTAH 375. AND 
SECTION -35-1-31, JTAH JODE .-ANNOTATED '953. -*3 AMENDED 3Y J H A P ^ R 
57, LAWS OF UTAH .955, .\S AMENDED 3Y CHAPTER '32. LAWS OF TJTAH 1957, 
AS AMENDED 3Y JHAPT3R 58. InWS OF JTAH 965, AS AMENDED 3Y 
CHAPTER 36, LAWS OF UTAH 1969, A S AMENDED BY CHAPTER 75. LAWS OF 
UTAH .971, AS AMENDED 3Y CHAPTER 101, LAWS OF UTAH 1973, \ND 
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REPEALING SECTION 35-1-48, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953; RELATING TO 
THE UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; BRINGING CURRENT LAWS 
INTO CONFORMITY WITH PRESENT PRACTICE; CORRECTING EAZUJER 
OMISSIONS; PROVIDING THAT PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES SHALL BE EY 
EMPLOYERS AND NOT THEIR INSURANCE COMPANIES; REQUIRING A 
REVIEW OF DEPENDENCY WHEN APPLYING FOR A CONTINUATION OF 
BENEFITS, ALLOWING A ROUNDING TO THE NEAREST DOLLAR OF THE 
WEEKLY COMPENSATION RATE; REQUIRING MINIMUM BENEFITS FOR ALL 
SPECIAL FUND PARTICIPANTS; AND REQUIRING ALL ENTITIES TO SECURE 
COMPENSATION FOR EMPLOYEES UNDER THE SAME OPTIONS; AND 
MAKING CHANGES REGARDING PROVIDING ARTIFICIAL MEANS OR 
APPLIANCES AND BURIAL EXPENSES. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section I. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read: 
35-1-7. Office at Salt Lake City—Sessions at any place. 
The commission shall keep its office [at the otato capitol] in Salt Lake 
City, and shall be furnished necessary rooms and office furniture; but the 
commission may hold sessions in any place within the state. 
Section 2. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read: 
35-1-41. Furnishing information to commission—Employers' annual 
report—Rights of commission—Examination of employers under oath 
—Penalties. 
Every employer shall furnish the commission, upon request, all 
information required by it to carry out the purposes of this title. In the 
month of July of each year every employer shall prepare and mail to the 
commission [at the—state capitol] a statement containing the following 
information, viz: The number of persons employed during the preceding 
year from July 1, to June 30, inclusive; the number of such persons 
employed at each kind of employment; the scale of wages paid in each class 
of employment, showing the minimum and maximum wages paid; and the 
aggregate amount of wages paid to all employees; which information shall 
be furnished on blanks to be prepared by the commission and furnished 
employers free of charge upon request therefor. Every employer shall cause 
such blanks to be properly filled out so as to answer fully and correctly all 
questions therein propounded, and shall give all the information therein 
sought, or, if unable to do so, he shall give to the commission, in writing, 
good and sufficient reasons for such failure. The commission may require 
the information herein required to be furnished to be made under oath and 
returned to ;he commission within the penoG fixea by :t or by '.aw. The 
commission. >r my member ;hereor\ or any person emoioyed ay the 
commission ror :hat purpose, .mail have the rigta 'o examine, under oath, 
any employer, a is agents or employees, for the purpose of ascertaining any 
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For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise 
provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission ehall 
deem equitable and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for 
specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in 
any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation 
for permanent total loss of bodily function. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations 
as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, 
and in no event shall more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in 
compensation be required to be paid. 
Section 6. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57, 
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as 
amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 71, 
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as 
amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65, 
Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as 
amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, as amended by Chapter 67, 
Laws of Utah 1973, as amended by Chapter 13, Laws of Utah 1974, as 
amended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1975, is amended to read: 
35-1-67, Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational 
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66 
2/3% of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more 
than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 
for a dependent [wife] spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under 
the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time 
of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury per week. However, in no case of permanent total 
disability shall the employer or its insurance carrier be required to pay 
such weekly compensation payments for more than 312 weeks; and 
provided further, that a finding by the commission of permanent total 
disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such time as the 
following proceedings have been had: Where the employee, has 
tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be 
mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah refer such employee to 
the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of the commission to 
order paid :o such vocational rsnanilitation division, out: of that special 
fund provided for by section 35- L—58 (1), not to exceed 31,000 for ase in the 
rehabilitation ana ".raining )f iucn ^mnioyee; ;he rehabilitation ana 
training oi sucn employee mail generally totlow the practice applicable 
under section 35-'i.-o9, and-relating no che rehabilitation >i employees 
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having combined injuries. If and when the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the industrial 
commission of Utah and in writing that such employee has fully co-
operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to 
rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not be 
rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that there be paid to such 
employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66 2/3% of his average weekly 
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent [-wile] spouse 
and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, 
up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed 
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not 
to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such 
period of time beginning with the time that the payments (as in this section 
provided) to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and 
ending with the death of the employee. No employee, however, shall be 
entitled to any such benefits if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the 
division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein. 
[Commencing July 1, 1071, all persona who are permanently and totally 
dioablod and on that date or prior' thereto were receiving compenoation 
benefito from the special-fand provided for by ooction 35 1 68 (1) ohall be 
paid compensation benofito at the rate of $60 per week.] 
[Commencing July 1,1075, all poroono who were permanently and totally 
dioablod on or before March 5, 1040, and wore receiving compenoation 
benefito and continue to receive ouch benefito ohall bo paid eompenontion 
benofito from the opeeial fund provided for by ocction 35 1 68 (1) at a rate 
oufficiont to bring their—weekly—benefit—to $60—when—eombincd with 
employer or insurance carrier compensation paymonto.] 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to 
benefits from the special fund designated in subsection (1) of section 35-1-68 
including those injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not leas than $75 
per week when paid only by the special fund, or when combined with 
compensation payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of 
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial 
commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and 
thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an 
opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee has, 
notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The .oss )r oermanem; and :ompiexe 'oss of use JI both hands 3r both 
arms, or zozh :eec or ootn legs, jr ootn eyes, :r of any :wo :heraoi\ snail 
inst i tute "ocai ina oermanent aisaoiiity, -o oe comuensated iccorainj? :o 
:ne provisions u :nis iection ma io :entaave ;:naing oi permanent 
:otai lisaoiiity snail 3e -eauirea ,n oucn nstances; n id xher :ases. 
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however, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but when 
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial 
permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to 
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided 
in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in 
excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week for 312 weeks. 
Section 7. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57, 
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as 
amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 71, 
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as 
amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65, 
Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as 
amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, as amended by Chapter 67, 
Laws of Utah 1973, as amended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1975, is 
amended to read: 
35-1-68. Injury causing death—Burial expenses—Filing claim within 
one year—Payment into state treasury when no dependents—Special 
fund—No dependents—Payments to dependents. 
In case injury causes death within the period of six years from the date 
of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial 
expenses of the deceased as provided [heroin] in section 35-1-81, and further 
benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows: 
(1) If there are no dependents, the employer and insurance carrier 
shall pay into the state treasury the sum of $15,600. Any claim for 
compensation must be filed with the commission within one year from the 
date of death of the deceased, and, if at the end of one year from the 
date of death of the deceased, no claim for compensation shall have been 
filed with the commission, the said sum of $15,600 shall be paid at that time 
into the state treasury by the employer or the insurance carrier. This 
payment shall be reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation 
payments paid to or due the deceased between the date of the accident 
and his death. Such payment shall be held in a special fund for the purposes 
provided in this title; the state treasurer shall be the custodian of such 
special fund, and the commission shall direct the distribution thereof. If 
the commission has reasonably determined that there are no dependents of 
the deceased, it may order the employer or insurance carrier to pay into 
the state treasury the sum specified in this subsection to be held in that 
special fund for a period of one year from the death of the deceased. Any 
claim filed within that year for which an award is made by the 
commission ahall be paid out of the sum aeuosited Dy the emolover or 
insurance currier )eiore my >%jrtner :iaim r.ay e^ issercea against 
\ne ^moiovpr jr nsurance :arr:er. 
EXHIBIT "H" 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH Ex. 'H' 
ROBERT L. SEI7Z, y ^ ^ > - ^ ^ ^ 
Appl icant , 
vs« 
UTAH FUEL COMPANY, 
Defendant, 
0 H D U 
Baeed on the rooords and f i l e s of the CcTraisrion 
and the admiss ions of t he de fendan t , i t appears t h a t Hobert 
S o i t z , t he above named a p p l i c a n t 7ms i n j u r e d by acc iden t a r i s i n g 
out of or in the course of h i s employment by the Utah Fuel Company 
on J u l y 28 , 1943, in which he s u s t a i n e d the l o s s of bo th len;s 
abo^-e the Icneos, the reby s u f f e r i n g permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y ; 
and i t f u r t h e r appea r ing t h a t Robert £ e i t z i s e n t i t l e d to the 
raaxirauE araourt of £8500,00 f o r -permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y cove r -
ing t h e l o s s of b o t h l e ^ s , as provided by Sec t ion 42 -1 -53 , Utah 
Code Annotated 1943 , as * amended 1945; t h a t a p p l i c a n t has t h r ee 
minor dependent ch i ld ren ,* Richard Al len S e i t z , t o r n August 5 f 
1942; B e t t y Caro l S e i t z , b o r n liarch 14, 1944 and Helen l&r ie S e i t z , 
born May 1945, wh ich e n t i t l e s him t o a -maximum payment of $22*50 
p e r week, p lus 5?J for each minor dependent c h i l d , or a t o t a l of 
$25,88 rper Treek. 
KOT TCTTTFOPJS, IT IS O^ERSD, t h a t Utah Fuel Co-pany 
p/iy t o Robert S e i t z , a l l radical and h o s p i t a l expenses i n c u r r e d , 
and compensat ion a t t he rat© of -$25.88 per week, u n t i l the amount 
of $8500.00 has been p a i d . 
IT IS FURTHER OBPEEED t h * t s u i t a b l e a r t i f i c i a l l i a b s 
be f u r n i s h e d t h e a p p l i c a n t a t the p roper t i j s e . 
M . 
Passed by the laduairiai Commission ot rJian. 
n^ j7_Hi*riL—j-ir^r _ 




Motion No. ^ Resolution No. ^ ' CoamUaioarc 
! • ' - , 
AliJlXiJjpjJ 
August 25, 1948 • '* ' • 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Gentlemen: 
On July 28, 1943, Robert Seitz was injured in 
the coixrse of his employment by Utah Fuel Company at 
the company's mine at Sunnyside* The injury resulted 
in the loss of both legs* We therefore admit liability 
for the maximum amount due for permanent total disability 
as provided by Utah Code Annotated 1943 as amended, 
42-1-63, 
Mr* Seitz has three dependent children as siiown 
on o\ir first report of injury* 
We will be glad to • have you enter an s?/ard in 
accordance with the foregoing* 
Very truly yours, 
(Signed) C. £. HENDERSON 
CEII: 3KM 
c c : Mr. Rober t S e i t z 
Surm.y3idc, Utah 
feXHJBIT NO. 
EXHIBIT " I " 
trx. x 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 90000685 







UTAH FUEL aka KAISER COAL, * 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, * 
• 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This case presents the legal issue of the effect to be given 
the May 10, 1977 amendment to §35-1-67 by the Legislature. 
The applicant sustained the loss of both legs above the knees 
in a traumatic amputation as the result of an industrial accident 
with Utah Fuel on July 28, 1948. The employer in accordance with 
the statute in effect on the date of the accident paid the 
applicant their statutory maximum liability of $8,500 for the 
applicant's statutory total disability. Thereafter, the employer 
created a dispatcher position for the applicant and the applicant 
was able to remain employed with the defendant until his retirement 
in February 1976 at age 64. 
On July 9, 1990 the applicant filed his claim for permanent 
total disability benefits alleging the same would be due and owing 
from the Employers Reinsurance Fund since the employer had 
satisfied its legal liability in this matter. The ERF responded 
with a denial of the claim on the grounds that the law in effect on 
the date of the applicant's controls the applicant's entitlement to 
permanent total disability benefits, and that law only provided for 
an award of $8,500 from the employer, with no provision for ERF 
involvement or liability for continuing benefits. By contrast, 
applicant contends that the amendment of May 10, 1977 does provide 
for ERF liability for continuing benefits to the applicant for his 
statutory permanent total disability. That amendment provides as 
follows: 
All persons who are permanently and 
totally disabled and anxii-lad oc 
benefits from one special fund 
designated in sucsec^ion ^1] or 
section 35-L-68 ^nciuaina Ariose 
irrured prior :o larcn i. 19^9. 
sna^ Ll receive not: less or.an 375 per 
weeK ^hen oaia oniv ov one special 
ROBERT J- SEITZ 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
fund, or when combined with 
compensation payment of the employer 
or the insurance carrier, (emphasis 
supplied) 
In view of the foregoing statutory language and the beneficent 
purpose of the Workers Compensation Act, it would appear to the 
Administrative Law Judge that the Legislature specifically intended 
to include applicant and others similarly situated on the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund (fnka "Special Fund") permanent total disability 
payroll. Otherwise, to take the approach urged by the Fund, the 
applicant would have only been entitled to receive $8,500 for the 
statutory permanent total disability sustained as the result of the 
industrial accident, and no other benefits. Apparently as the 
result of the inadequacy and injustice of the provisions for 
permanent total benefits for those injured before March 6, 1949, 
the Legislature amended the Act to include those previously left 
outside the scope of §67, By so doing the Legislature corrected an 
injustice and insured that all permanent total disability claimants 
would be treated equally, especially considering that workers 
compensation is the applicant's exclusive remedy for his tragic 
injury. 
Therefore, I find that pursuant to §3 5-1-67 as amended May 10, 
1977 that the applicant is entitled to receive statutory permanent 
total disability benefits from the ERF at the statutory minimum 
rate of $75 per week commencing effective May 10, 1977. 
Subsequently, the Legislature has from time to time increased the 
statutory minimum rate for permanent total disability, which 
increases shall also apply to applicant's benefits. 
The applicant has also had the benefit of legal counsel in 
this matter, who has conducted extensive legal and record research 
on applicant's behalf. Counsel has requested a fee of 15% of the 
award generated pursuant to Rule 16, which was in effect on the 
date of the industrial injury. I find that the fee under the 
circumstances of this case is reasonable with the limitation that 
the 15% shall be of the orincisai sum awarded and shall not include 
ROBERT J. SEITZ 
ORDER 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Robert J. Seitz is statutorily permanently and totally 
disabled as the result of the industrial accident of July 28, 1948, 
and pursuant to §3 5-1-67 as amended May 10, 1977 Mr. Seitz is 
entitled to permanent total benefits at the statutory minimum rate 
from the ERF for as long as he shall live. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Employers Reinsurance Fund 
place Robert J. Seitz on the permanent total disability payroll 
effective May 10, 1977 with payments to be made at the statutory 
minimum rate of $75 per week, with such subsequent increases as 
have mandated by the Legislature in amendments to §67. Accrued 
amounts shall be due in a lump sum and shall include interest of 8% 
per annum from May 17, 1977. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers Reinsurance Fund pay 
Virginius Dabney, attorney for applicant, 15% of the principal 
award (i.e. exclusive of interest) accrued as of the date hereof, 
the same to deducted from the aforesaid award to the applicant and 
remitted directly to his office. 
ROBERT J. SEITZ 
ORDER 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and , unless so filed, this Order shall be final and 




Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
this 21 day of May, 1991. 
ATTEST: 
Patricia O. Ashb^___^^Z 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on May 21, 1991, a copy of the attached 
Order in the case of Robert J. Seitz was mailed to the following 
persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Robert J. Seitz 
P.O. 146 
Sunnyside, UT 8453 9 
Virginius Dabney, Esq. 
350 south 400 E., #202 
SLC, Utah 84111 
Erie Boorman 
ERF 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Wilma Burrows 
T ^ ^ C ^ i ^ - - ^ ^ 
EXHIBIT "J 
tx, J 
ERIE V. BOORMAN, Administrator 
EMPLOYERS* REINSURANCE FUND 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P. 0. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Telephone: (801) 530-6820 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 




vs. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
UTAH FUEL aka KAISER COAL and THE * 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND, * Case No. 90000685 
Defendants. * 
Defendant Employers' Reinsurance Fund (ERF) files this Motion for Review 
of the Order issued by Presiding Law Judge, Timothy C. Allen, in the 
above-entitled matter on May 21, 1991. 
1. As a matter of law - Applicant has no Workers' Compensation rights 
against ERF or against his Employer Utah Fuel (Kaiser Coal) arising 
out of his industrial injury of July 28, 1948: 
A. Applicant's permanent total disability benefits are 
determined and limited by the provisions and 
parameters of the Permanent Total Disability Statute 
in effect on the July 28, 1948, date of his 
industrial injury. That Statute is Section 42-1-63, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943 as amended 1945 (attached 
hereto as Exhibit A). In brief, Section 42-1-63 was 
amended in 1945 to eliminate the lifetime permanent 
total disability liability of the employer and 
replace it with a maximum benefit of $8,500.00. That 
provision - all parties have agreed - was in effect 
and was applicable to Applicant's industrial injury 
of July 23, 1948. 
3. Applicant's employer acknowledged his injury of 
7/23/48 as a permanent -otal disability injury and 
requested an Order from the Industrial Commission. 
(Attached as Exhibit B). 
C. On August 27, 1948, the Industrial Commission issued 
its Order awarding Applicant permanent total 
disability benefits in accordance with 42-1-63, as 
amended 1945, i.e., $25.88 per week, effective 
7/28/48 until the Statutory maximum of $8,500.00 had 
been paid. (Attached as Exhibit C). There is no 
dispute that the Order was paid in full by the 
employer. 
All of the above combine to constitute the Crux of this 
controversy. First, we have a Statute which clearly defines 
Permanent Total Disability, the amount of weekly benefits to which 
the disabled employee is entitled and the limitation or endpoint of 
those benefits, i.e., when the maximum of $8,500.00 has been paid. 
Secondly, we have an employee who qualifies for the full amount of 
those permanent total disability benefits, as well as an employer 
who acknowledges the injury and the Applicant's eligibility benefits 
under the Statute and requests an Order to that effect from the 
Commission. Third, we have an Order from the Commission setting 
forth Applicant's eligibility for benefits, the exact amount per 
week to be paid by the employer and the maximum amount of 
compensation to which the applicant was entitled under the Statute. 
Finally, we have full acknowledgment that the employer paid and the 
Applicant received the maximum compensation set forth in the Statute 
and Ordered by the Commission. 
When that amount was received, Applicant's rights to 
compensation under the Statute and Utah Workers' Compensation Law 
ceased and che ampioyer's compensation liability under the Xct 
likewise came to an and- In 3horr the compensation case *as closed. 
9 
2 Statutory and Utah Case Authority: 
A. Applicable Statute: The only Statute pertinent to 
the rights and liabilities of Applicant and E3F in 
this controversy is Section 42-1-63 Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, as amended 1945, set forth above and 
found in Exhibit A, attached. That Section, all have 
agreed, was the Permanent Total Disability Statute in 
effect on the date of Applicant's industrial injury, 
July 28, 1948. It sets forth Applicant's 
compensation rights clearly; likewise it establishes 
definitely the permanent total disability maximum 
liability of defendants, i.e., "provided however, 
that in no case of permanent total disability shall 
more than $8,500.00 be required to be paid.** That 
language was explicitly inserted because it deleted 
completely the former lifetime payment language 
"until the death of such person so totally 
disabled." It remained in effect as to all injuries 
occurring between its effective date July 1, 1945 and 
until the Section was rewritten effective March 5, 
1949. 
B. Case Authority: It is established Utah Workers' 
Compensation Law that one is entitled to have his 
rights determined on the basis of the law as it 
existed at the time of the occurrence, and that a 
later Statute or amendment should not be applied in a 
retroactive manner to deprive a party of his rights 
or impose greater liability upon him. Okland 
Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 
208, 209 (1974); Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, 740 P. 2d 305, 308 where the following 
language is found: 
la Workers' Compensation cases, rights and 
liabilities are determined as of the date the injury 
occurred . . . . (cases cited) . . . Later Statutes 
or amendments may not be applied retroactively to 
deprive a party of rights or impose greater liability 
unless the later Statute or amendment clarifies or 
amplifies how the earlier law should be understood. 
(Citing Okland, supra) 
Here, there is no issue as to clarification of the 1945 amendment to 
42-1-63 which intentionally and unmistakably deleted the lifetime obligation 
or the amployer and inserted in its stead the 58,500.00 maximum permanent 
total disability compensation liability. See also, Jmith /. Industrial 
Commission. 549 ?.2d -48, <*49 (1976) '"benefits were definable as to maximum 
3 
time for payment and amount, were governed by the wording of the Section on 
date of injury . . .** Any additional benefits would not oe awardab]e by 
amendment thereafter . . . 
". . . So amendment in 1973 that did enlarge such benefits would l*ave no 
application here.** In that case, as_ here, an amendment to Workers* 
Compensation Death Benefit Statute provided greater dependent widow benefits 
than the Statute in effect on the date of the injury resulting in death. The 
Utah Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Commission award based upon the 
Statute in effect on the date of the injury. 
Finally, see recent Court of Appeals decision in Wicat Systems v. 
Pellegrini, 721 P.2d 686, 687 (1989) where the Court held that the allocation 
of liability amendments in 1984 increased the percentage liability of 
plaintiff and thus enlarged its obligations. "These kinds of amendments fit 
within the category held not to be retroactive.** The Court held that the 
amendments were not in clarification of existing law and applied properly the 
law in effect at the time of injury. 
In summary, the law on the date of Applicant's injury in this case was 
clear and amendments to the Statute thereafter which enlarged the rights of 
Applicant and which created a substantial liability in Defendant Employers* 
Reinsurance Fund which did not exist under the Statute in effect at the date 
of injury cannot be applied retroactively as contended by Applicant. 
Established Utah Workers* Compensation Law as demonstrated by the cases cited 
above and many others make it clear that as a matter of law, Applicant has no 
permanent total disability rights beyond those awarded to him - and paid -
under Section 42-1—63 as it existed on -he data or his July 23, 1948 injury. 
AS a corollary, 5HF lad no liability to Applicant: under -hat Statute and che 
Later Statute amendments cannot be applied retroactively co create a 
4 
substantial liability for this defendant where no_ liablity existed under the 
law in effect on the date of injury. 
3. As a third and separate defense, this Permanent Total Disability 
compensation case having been subject to a final Permaa«>4it Total 
Disability Order by the Industrial Commission and completely r.iosed 
out by full compliance with that Order, is beyond the jurisdiction 
of the Commission to reopen for the alleged purpose of ordering 
additional compensation. 
This was a Permanent Total Disability injury from the 
beginning. The Employer acknowledged its liability under the 
Statute for the maximum Permanent Total Disability award. The 
Industrial Commission issued its Order for full Permanent Total 
Disability benefits on August 27, 1948. That Order was fully 
complied with and satisfied by the Employer and the case closed. 
Thus, under established Utah Law, the Commission has no 
jurisdiction, by Statute or otherwise, to reopen the case almost 40 
years later and award additional benefits to Applicant or to create 
additional liability in the defendants, or either of them. 
The circumstances involved and the Order issued in this case fall 
squarely within the rationale of the Jurisdiction Rulings of the following 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Decisions: 
a. Retherford v. Industrial Commission, 739 P.2d 76 (Utah App. 
1987). 
b. Ring v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App. 
1987). 
c. Thiessens v. Dept. of Emp. Sec, 663 P.2d 72 (Utah 1983). 
Respectfully submitted -his *Z*J? day or June, 1991-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on June Z6 m, 1991., a true and correct 
copy of the attached MOTION FOR REVIEW , in the case of ROBERT L. SEIT2 , 
was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Honorable Timothy C. Allen, Industrial Commission of Utah 
Virginius Dabney, Atty., DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C., 350 South 400 East, Suite 
202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 90000685 
ROBERT L. SEITZ# * 
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* 
vs. * DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
UTAH FUEL aka KAISER COAL and * 
the EMPLOYERS'REINSURANCE FUND * 
EMPLOYERS FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah, on Motion of the Defendcint, 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the Applicant, Robert L. 
Seitz, reviews the Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated May 
21, 1991, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 
63-46b-12, awarding the Applicant permanent total disability 
benefits. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission 
for review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Ann. The 
Defendant, Employer's Reinsurance Fund, argues that the law in 
effect at the time of the injury is the controlling statute. In 
contrast, the Applicant argues that the statutory changes made by 
the legislature on May 10, 1977, mandate that the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund pay the Applicant additional continuing benefits 
as a result of his permanent total disability. 
Counsel for the Applicant raised the additional issue of his 
entitlement to an attorney's fee which includes interest on the 
accrued and unpaid compensation due the Applicant. 
The Commission is of the opinion that the issues to be decided 
are the effect of the May 10, 1977, amendment to section 3 5-1-67 
U.C.A. on the Applicant's claim and whether a reasonable attorney's 
fee includes interest on the accrued and unpaid compensation. 
As mentioned above, the Applicant alleges that permanent total 
disability benefits are due and owing from the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund or ^'special fund" since tne employer satisfied its 




The Employers' Reinsurance Fund denies liability on the 
grounds that the law in effect on the date of the Applicant's 
injury controls the Applicant's entitlement to permanent total 
disability benefits. Further, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
argues that the law only provided for an award of $8,500 from the 
employer, with no provision for Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
involvement or liability for continuing benefits. The relevant 
statutory amendment provides as follows: 
All persons who are permanently and 
totally disabled and entitled to 
benefits from the special fund 
designated in subsection (1) of 
section 35-1-68 including those 
injured prior to March 6, 1949, 
shall receive not less than $75 per 
week when paid only by the special 
fund, or when combined with 
compensation payment of the 
employer or the insurance carrier, 
(emphasis supplied) 
In view of the remedial purposes underlying the Workers 
Compensation Act and a plain reading of the statutory language, it 
appears that the Legislature intended to include the Applicant and 
others similarly situated on the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund/"special fund" permanent total disability payroll. 
Otherwise, the Applicant would have only been entitled to receive 
$8,500 for the statutory permanent total disability sustained as 
the result of his industrial accidents The language of the statute 
indicates that as a result of the inadequacy and injustice of the 
provisions for permanent total benefits for those injured before 
March 6, 1949, the Legislature amended the Act to include those 
previously left outside the scope of §67. In doing so, the 
Legislature intended to correct an injustice and insure that all 
permanent total disability claimants would be treated on a more 
equal basis. 
Therefore, pursuant to §35-1-67, U.C.A., as amended, May 10, 
1977, the Applicant is entitled to receive statutory permanent 
total disability benefits from the ERF at the statutory minimum 
rate of $75 per W€>ek commencing effective May 10, 1977. The 
Administrative Law Judges7 ruling on this point is supported by 




Administrative Law Judges' decision that subsequent legislative 
enactments increasing the statutory minimum rate for permanent 
total disability are also applicable to the Applicant's benefits is 
also supported by the evidence. 
With regard to the attorney's fees issue, in his Order, the 
Administrative Law Judge stated, "Counsel has requested a fee. of 
15% of the award generated pursuant to Rule 16, which was in effect 
on the date of the industrial injury. I find that the fee under 
the circumstances of this case is reasonable with the limitation 
that the 15% shall be of the principal sum awarded and shall not 
include interest." 
Counsel for the Applicant now claims that this award is 
unreasonable. In support of his argument, Applicant's attorney 
argues that "interest is every bit a part of compensation and that 
the generation of compensation in fact includes a concomitant 
generation of interest for compensation of a reasonable attorney's 
fee." Counsel also requested that a decision in the above 
referenced case be deferred until a decision in DON R. NIELSON 
v.MORTON THIOKOL, and the EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND (Case No. 
B89000457, 86001144) was rendered. In Nielsen the Industrial 
Commission, in a two to one decision, determined that reasonable 
attorney's fees do not include interest generated on accrued and 
unpaid compensation benefits. This decision by the Industrial 
Commission is controlling precedent. Therefore, counsel for the 
Applicant is not entitled to attorney's fees which include interest 
on the accrued and unpaid compensation. 
The Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are supported in this case by substantial 
evidence in light of the whole record. 
,> 
For the foregoing reasons, it is the opinion of the Commission 
that the Administrative Law Judges' Order should be affirmed. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Review of the 
Employer's Reinsurance Fund, dated June 20, 1991, is hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Review of the 




Any appeal shall be to the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty 
(30) days of the date hereof pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sections 
35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-16. Costs to prepare 
transcripts for appeals purposes shall be borne by the party 
requesting the transcripts. 
Stephen M.' Hadley 
Commissioner . , V.J s~ 
Dixie L. Minson V~_ 
Commissioner 
I dissent from the majority view because it appears clear to 
me that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's position is well founded, 
although it is difficult to comprehend and detect the subtle 
meaning of the words created in 1977 by the legislature, when it 
repealed the provisions from 1971, including its update in 1973, 
and from 1974. 
In my view, those words created in 1977 say that not less than 
$75 per week shall be paid to all permanently and totally disabled 
persons, including those injured prior to March 6, 1949, who are 
entitled to benefits. In this phrasing, I have restructured the 
language from the 1977 enactment to set the emphasized and key 
phrase at the last instead of being lost in the middle as it is in 
the statute. 
Unfortunately, persons such as Mr, Seitz with injuries 
incurred between July 1, 1945 and March 4, 1949, inclusive, simply 
are excluded from what I would construe was the probable intent of 
the 1977 legislation because of the nature of the wording, because 
they simply are not entitled to benefits under any law, at any 
time, including that in effect at the time of the injury. In other 
words, the 1977 statutory change placed Mr. Seitz in a category for 
checking to determine if he is entitled to benefits, but the law in 
effect at the time of his injury or any other subsequent 
modification of that law, simply does, allpjtf /nis specific 
entitlement. ..-^  /'' 
pliiJlL 
Thomas R. Car l son 
C e r t i f i e d t h i s "J-tJJ clay o f r j - a n u a r y j 
ATTEST: > ~ j:<M.,<^.,.Z,JI 
.-/ 
- ^ — - \ 
P a t r i c i a 0. Asnby ,r— \ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on February 7, 1992, a copy of the attached 
ORDER DENYING MOTIN FOR REVIEW in the case of ROBERT L. SEITZ, 
was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, 
postage paid: 
ERIE V. BOORMAN, ESQ, 
Employers7 Reinsurance Fund of Utah 
Mr. Robert L. Seitz 
P.O. Box 146 
Sunnyside, Utah 84539 
Virginius Dabney, Esq. 
Dabney & Dabney, 
350 South 400 East Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Timothy C. Allen 
Presiding Administrative Law Judge 
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Debra S. RETHERFORD, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
and American Telephone & Telegraph 
(Self-Insured), Defendants. 
No. 870016-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 22, 1987. 
Employer filed motion to dismiss peti-
tion for writ of review in workers' compen-
sation case. The Court of Appeals held 
that Industrial Commission had no jurisdic-
tion to consider worker's petition for recon-
sideration of denial of motion to review and 
the petition thus did not extend the time 
for filing petition for writ of review with 
the Court of Appeals. 
Petition dismissed. 
1. Workers' Compensation <s=»1090, 1778 
Administrative law judge has discre-
tion to reopen workers' compensation case 
and enter a supplemental order, amend, or 
modify the original order, or refer the case 
to the entire Industrial Commission for re-
view. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-82.52. 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=>1782 
Failure to present evidence to referee 
or Industrial Commission originally does 
not justify exercise of the Commission's 
continuing jurisdiction so as to authorize it 
to enter a later order. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-
78. 
3e Workers' Compensation <3=»1813 
Industrial Commission does not have 
jurisdiction to consider petition for rehear-
ing. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-82.53. 
1. At the time set for evidentiary hearing, defend-
ant AT & T made a motion to dismiss plaintiffs 
claim for failure to state a compensable indus-
trial accident Plaintiffs theory was that she 
was subjected to unwanted sexual advances 
from a co-employee. The administrative law 
judge concluded that based on the legal argu-
ment and evidence m tne rile, plaintiff had not 
satisfied her burden of ^roving that sne sus-
tained an industrial accident. 
4. Workers' Compensation <3=>1806 
Industrial Commission had no jurisdic-
tion to consider worker's petition for recon-
sideration of denial of motion to review so 
that time for filing petition for writ of 
review with the Court of Appeals began to 
run on the date of the notice of the order 
disposing of the case on the merits and not 
on the date of the later denial of the peti-
tion for reconsideration. U.C.A.1953, 35-
1-82.51 et seq. 
Phillip B. Shell, Day & Barney, Murray, 
for plaintiff. 
Stuart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant American Tel. & Tel 
Ralph Finlayson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
Industrial Com'n. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and 
DAVIDSON, JJ. (On Law and Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the Court on the 
Motion to Dismiss of defendant American 
Telephone and Telegraph (AT & T). AT & 
T seeks dismissal of plaintiffs petition for 
writ of review, contending that it was not 
timely filed under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
83 (1986). We agree that the petition for 
review was not timely filed and dismiss the 
petition. 
I. 
Plaintiff Debra S. Retherford applied for 
workers' compensation benefits claiming 
she had suffered injuries from a compensa-
ble industrial accident. On October 21, 
1986, an administrative law judge ordered 
the claim dismissed, with prejudice.1 The 
plaintiff filed a Motion for Review on No-
vember 10, 1986.2 On November 20, 1986, 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.55 (1986) provides, 
in part, that a motion for review "must be filed 
within fifteen days of the date of any order of 
the administrative law judge or the commission 
unless further time is granted by the administra-
tive law judge or commission within fifteen 
davs, and unless so filed, said order shall be-
come the award of the commission and shall be 
rmai." Tt thus appears that the motion for re-
view tiled on Novemoer 10, 1986 was not time-
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the entire Industrial Commission adopted 
the administrative law judge's findings and 
conclusions and affirmed the dismissal of 
plaintiffs claim. On December 8, 1986, the 
plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
of Denial of Motion to Review, which was 
also denied by the entire commission on 
December 19, 1986. On January 20, 1987, 
plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Review 
by this Court 
Defendant AT & T moved for summary 
disposition of plaintiffs petition for judicial 
review on grounds the petition was not 
timely, halving been filed approximately six-
ty days after the Industrial Commission's 
Order of November 20, 1986. AT & T 
contends that the commission, having once 
disposed of the case on the merits, had no 
further jurisdiction over the matter. Ac-
cordingly, AT & T contends the motion for 
reconsideration could not operate to extend 
the time to petition for review by this 
Court Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues 
that the statutory provisions governing the 
review of orders in workers' compensation 
cases, while not specifically authorizing a 
"motion for reconsideration", do not pre-
clude such motions. Plaintiff thus con-
tends that her petition for writ of review 
was timely because it was filed within thir-
ty days after the commission's denial of the 
Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of 
Motion for Review. 
II. 
The statutory provisions governing 
claims for workers' compensation benefits 
establish a detailed procedure for adminis-
ly. Because neither party addresses the issue of 
timeliness of the motion for review, and the 
entire record is not before us, we presume, 
without ruling on the question, that the commis-
sion allowed additional t ime in which to file the 
motion for review. Our consideration is limited 
to the issue of whether the petition for writ of 
review \was fried vnth this Court vnthin the t ime 
period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83 
(1986). 
3c The present statutory provisions pertaining to 
appeals from awards of the Industrial Commis-
sion under the worker's compensation statutes 
were enacted in >965. Former Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-i.-82 (reDeaied 1965) provided: 
Any party including the commission of ii-
nance io a proceeding Derore the commission 
trative and judicial review of orders of the 
Industrial Commission.3 Hearings on an 
application for benefits may be held "be-
fore the commission sitting as administra-
tive law judges or any administrative law 
judge of the commission, or any commis-
sioner as chief administrative law judge", 
after which the commission or the adminis-
trative law judge shall make findings of 
fact and an order. Utah Code Ann. § 35-
1-82.52 (1986). "The order of the adminis-
trative law judge shall be the final award 
of the commission unless a petition for 
review is filed as provided in 35-1-82.53." 
Id 
[1] A party may initiate review of the 
order of an administrative law judge or the 
commission under Utah Code Ann, § 35-1-
82.53 (1986), which provides: 
(1) Any party in interest who is dissat-
isfied with the order entered by an ad-
ministrative law judge or the commission 
may file a motion for review of such 
order. Upon the filing of a motion to 
review his order the administrative law 
judge may (a) reopen the case and enter 
a supplemental order . . or (b) amend or 
modify his prior order by a supplemental 
order; or (c) refer the entire case to the 
commission. If the administrative law 
judge makes a supplemental order, as 
provided above, it shall be final unless a 
motion to review the same shall be filed 
with the commission. 
The foregoing section allows an administra-
tive law judge the discretion to reopen the 
case and enter a supplemental order, 
may, and before he can seek a review in the 
supreme court shall, within thirty days after 
written notice of its decision file an applica-
tion before the commission for a rehearing of 
the matter. 
The pre-1965 provisions further provided that 
an appeal to the Supreme Court was to be initi-
ated "within thirty days after the notice that the 
application for a rehearing is denied, or, if the 
application is granted within thirty days after 
notice of the rendition of the decision on the 
rehearing." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83 (amend-
ed 1965). The 1965 amendments established 
ffte present review orovisions of Utan Code Ann. 
§§ 35-1-^2.51 -nrougn 35-1-82.56, and amend-
ed section J5- i -o3 to De consistent with 'hose 
provisions. 
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amend or modify the original order made 
pursuant to section 35-1-82.52, or refer the 
case to the entire commission for review. 
In this manner, an administrative law 
judge may correct any error or omission in 
the original order before review by the 
entire commission. If a supplemental or-
der is entered by an administrative law 
judge, a motion for review of that order 
may be filed with the commission. Any 
motion for review of an original or supple-
mental order of an administrative law 
judge or an order of the commission sitting 
as administrative law judges must be filed 
within fifteen days of the date of the order 
unless an extension is granted within that 
fifteen day period by the commission or the 
administrative law judge. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-82.55 (1986). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.54 (1986) de-
scribes the procedure for administrative re-
view by the commission as follows: 
The commission, upon referral of a case 
to it by an administrative law judge, or 
upon a motion being filed with it to re-
view its own order, or an administrative 
law judge's supplemental order, shall re-
view the entire record made in said case, 
and, in its discretion, may hold further 
hearing and receive further evidence, and 
make findings of fact and enter its 
award thereon. The award of the com-
mission shall be final unless set aside by 
the Supreme Court as hereinafter provid-
ed.4 
Once the commission has disposed of the 
case pursuant to section 35-1-82.53, a par-
ty may seek judicial review pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83 (1986), which 
reads* 
Within 30 days after the commission has 
given notice of its award, provided a 
motion was previously filed in accord-
ance with this act for review of the order 
or supplemental order upon which the 
award was based, any affected party, 
including the Division of Finance, may 
file an action in the Court of Appeals for 
review and determination of the lawful-
ness of the award. 
4. Utah Code Ann. 1 35-i-32.54 (1986) was not 
amended to reflect the transfer or mnsdiction 
over petitions ror ^eview or Industrial Commis-
III. 
There is no case law specifically consider-
ing whether the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-82.51 through § 35-1-82.55 al-
low a motion for reconsideration (or addi-
tional motions for review) once the Indus-
trial Commission has rendered its decision 
on the merits pursuant to section 35-1-82.-
54, and if so, whether filing of such a 
motion extends the time for filing a petition 
for review with this Court Thus, the is-
sues presented by defendant AT & T's mo-
tion are of first impression. Cases decided 
under the former statutes, however, estab-
lish principles regarding judicial review of 
orders in workers' compensation cases that 
are instructive in this case. 
In Ferguson v. Industrial Commission, 
63 Utah 112, 221 P. 1099 (1924), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered a situation anal-
oguous to the present case. The Industrial 
Commission denied benefits to the claim-
ant, and the claimant filed a timely petition 
for rehearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-82 (repealed 1965), which was also 
denied. Approximately four months after 
the denial of the petition for rehearing, the 
claimant filed a second petition for rehear-
ing, which the commission granted. After 
a hearing, the commission again dismissed 
the application. Within thirty days from 
the date of the order of the commission on 
the second petition for rehearing, the claim-
ant applied to the Utah Supreme Court for 
a writ of review. The Court held: 
The first petition for rehearing having 
been denied on May 8, 1922, the jurisdic-
tion of the Industrial Commission ceased. 
It was then incumbent upon the applicant 
to apply to this court for a writ of review 
or to abide by the decision. 
221 P. at 1099. See also Crippen v. Sun-
land Center, 372 So.2d 63 (Fla.1979) (The 
time for filing a notice of certiorari was not 
tolled by filing of a motion for reconsidera-
tion or rehearing where such a motion was 
not authorized under the applicable rules of 
sion orders to the Utah Court or Appeals as 
orovided in LJtan Code Ann. § 55-1-33 U986). 
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procedure); Chambers v. Industrial Com- award. The Court considered whether the 
mission, 132 Ill.App.3d 891, 88 Ill.Dec. 183, commission, having denied the first petition 
478 N.E.2d 498 (1985) (Where no statute for rehearing, could reopen the case and 
authorized a motion for reconsideration or reverse its original order. The Utah Su-
rehearing, the only recourse following en- preme Court concluded the holding in Fer~ 
try of a final order was to file a writ of guson v. Industrial Commission was dis-
certiorari.) positive, and held that the commission did 
[2] The Utah Supreme Court re- not have jurisdiction to make the award of 
affirmed the holding of the Ferguson case benefits having once determined the matter 
in Kennecoit Copper Corp. v. Industrial on the merits.5 
Commission, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952 
(1967). In that case, the Industrial Com- f33 The provisions for review of orders 
mission entered an order on February 17, of the Industrial Commission in worker's 
1965 denying a claim for benefits. The compensation cases do not authorize mo-
claimant filed an application for a rehear- tions for reconsideration or rehearing or 
ing under former Utah Code Ann. § 35-1- additional motions to review beyond those 
82 (repealed 1965), which was denied on motions authorized in Utah Code Ann. 
March 12, 1965. The claimant did not file a § 35-1-82.53 (1986).6 The statutory review 
petition for writ of certiorari with the Utah procedure provides adequate opportunity 
Supreme Court under former Utah Code for correction of error by the commission, 
Ann. § 35-1-83 (amended 1965). On April and establishes the point at which the pro-
13, 1965, the commission rescinded its or- ceedings before the commission are culmi-
der of March 12 denying compensation and nated. In addition, the Utah Supreme 
ordered a rehearing. The rehearing was Court held in Pease v. Industrial Commis-
held and, on December 14, 1965, the com- sion, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984) that in 
mission entered an order granting benefits filing a motion for review under Utah Code 
to the claimant Kennecott petitioned for Ann. § 35-1-82.53, a claimant has an obli-
judicial review contending that the commis- gation to raise all issues that can be 
sion did not have authority to make the presented at that time and. those issues not 
5. The Utah Supreme Court also held in the Ken-
necott Copper Corporation case that Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-78 (1986) did not grant the Indus-
trial Commission jurisdiction to reverse its orig-
inal order. That section provides, in relevant 
part: 'The powers and jurisdiction of the com-
mission over each case shall be continuing, and 
it may from time to time make such modifica-
tion or change with respect to former findings, 
or orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion 
may be justified " Case law construing sec-
tion 35-1-78 has established that the continuing 
jurisdiction of the commission is applicable 
where there has been a change in the claimant's 
condition (an improvement or deterioration of 
physical condition) since the time of the com-
mission's order, or where evidence has been 
discovered that was not available for considera-
tion when the original order was made. See 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952, 953 (1967); 
see also Mecham v. Industrial Commission, 692 
P.2d 783, 736 (Utah 1984); Spencer v. Industrial 
Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185. 290 P.2d 692, 694-
95 (1955); Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commis-
sion, ol Utah 514, 215 P.* 1047, 1048 (Utah 1923), 
Because rtie commission's order in tnis case 
held that there was no comoensable industrial 
accident, there is no issue as to wnich reopening 
for a change in condition would apply. See 3 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 8L-
32(a) (In a reopening proceeding, neither party 
can raise original issues such as work-connec-
tion, employee or employer status, occurrence 
of a compensable accident, and degree of dis-
ability.) At the time of oral argument, plain-
tiffs counsel represented that certain matters 
that could have been presented below were not 
advanced by plaintiffs previous counsel. We 
conclude that such an omission does not justify 
an exercise of the commission's continuing jur-
isdiction. See also Pease v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984) (In filing a 
motion for review under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-82.54, a person has an obligation to 
raise all issues that can be presented at that time 
and those issues not raised are waived.) 
6. As alternative grounds for dismissal, AT & T 
contends that Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 
74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966), in which the Utah 
Supreme Court heid that no 'motion for recon-
sideration" is allowed under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is aist>ositive of tnis rnattei". Be-
cause we conciuae dismissal of the petition for 
review is required under the workers' compen-
sation statutes, ve find it unnecessary to ad-
dress this argument. 
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raised are waived. It logically follows that 
the availability of a petition for rehearing 
should not be implied from the absence of 
any express prohibition in the statute, and 
we reject plaintiffs contention to that ef-
fect 
[4] The jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Commission over workers' compensation 
cases is fixed by statute, as is this Court's 
jurisdiction over judicial review of the Com-
mission's orders. See Schockmeyer v. In-
dustrial Commission, 23 Utah 2d 346, 463 
P.2d 562 (Utah 1970); see also 3 Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 80.52(a) 
(1986). Based upon our reading of the 
review provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-82.51 et seq. and case law under the 
former statutory provisions, we conclude 
that the commission had no jurisdiction to 
consider the Petition for Reconsideration of 
Denial of Motion to Review.7 The time for 
filing a petition for writ of review with this 
Court began to run on November 20, 1986, 
the date of notice of the order of the com-
mission disposing of the case on the mer-
its.8 No petition for writ of review was 
filed within thirty days of the date of notice 
of the order as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-83 (1986). This Court is without 
jurisdiction to review the final order of the 
commission because plaintiffs petition for 
writ of review was not timely filed. Plain-
tiffs petition for writ of review is, accord-
ingly, dismissed. 
BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIDSON, 
JJ., concur. 
£ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
»> 
7. As in the Ferguson case, although the proceed-
ings subsequent to November 20, 1986 were 
without authority, they did not change the result 
previously reached. 221 P. at 1099. The No-
vember 20, 1986 order is the final order of the 
commission for purposes of seeking judicial re-
view. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.56 (1986) provides: 
All parties in interest snail be given due notice 
Neil JORGENSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Allen ISSA, dba Allen's TV & 
Electronics, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 860012-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 1, 1987. 
Tractor trailer owner brought negli-
gence action against motorist, seeking 
damages allegedly sustained when tractor 
trailer overturned. The District Court, 
Sevier County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered 
judgment on verdict finding each party 50% 
negligent, and owner appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that 
court's instructions adequately set out 
owner's theory of case. 
Affirmed. 
1. Trial <3=>203(1) 
A party is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case. 
2. Appeal and Error <®=>1067 
Trial <s=>268 
Failure to give requested instructions 
is reversible error if it tends to mislead the 
jury to the prejudice of the complaining 
party or insufficiently or erroneously advis-
es the jury of the law. 
3. Appeal and Error «=>1067 
It is not prejudicial error to fail to use 
specific requested jury instructions if the 
substance of the requested instructions is 
covered in the instructions given. 
of the entry of any administrative law judge's 
order or any order or award of the commission. 
The mailing of the copy of said order or award 
to the last known address shown in the files of 
the commission or any party in interest and to 
the attorneys or agents of record in the case, if 
any, snail be deemed to be notice of said order/' 
The November 20, 1986 order reflects that it 
was maiied to plaintiff on the same date. 
EXHIBIT "M" 
EXHIBIT aM" 
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Divorce €=252 
Divorce court's award with respect to 
property and money payments to be made 
by husband was proper despite fact that it 
did not conform to husband's contention 
that he should receive two-thirds of prop-
erty. 
E. H. Fankhauser, of Cotro-Manes, 
Warr, Fankhauser & Beasley, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Ray H. I vie, of I vie, Young & Stott, 
Provo, for defendant and respondent 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice: 
Appeal from a judgment in a divorce 
case, where after an amendment in the 
pleadings and proof reducing the amount 
of a previous award, and favoring appel-
lant in such amendment with respect to 
property and money payments, he nonethe-
less appealed. Affirmed with no costs on 
appeal assessed. 
The parties married in 1950. About sev-
en months later came their first child. A 
divorce followed in April 1952, followed by 
another child in July 1952, followed by a 
resumption, without benefit of marriage, of 
the bed and board bit, followed by the pur-
chase jointly of a home, followed by anoth-
er child in November 1954, followed by a 
marriage ceremony in 1956, followed by re-
cording of the deed to the house as hus-
band and wife, who were not that at the 
time of the purchase, after which another 
child was born in 1961. Three and a half 
years later they separated and Mr. L. sued 
for a divorce, and Mrs. L. countered, won, 
got a property and alimony award. Mr. L. 
now says: 1) The decree was inequitable, 
2) exceeds the sort of dowered theory of 
one-third to the woman and two-thirds to 
the man syndrome, and 3) anyway the de-
cree otherwise was inequitable. 
The one-third, two-third computer com-
plex seems to be the thrust of this case. 
The computer may be accurate mathemati-
cally, but this court has a different set of 
ioganthms. The decision of the trial 
judge, — who was malleable enough to 
soothe the pain somewhat of Mr. L., ap-
pellant, — by reducing the amount of the 
award on the latter's motion, but which 
did not comport to, but exceeded the one-
third, two-third number we think was cor-
rect. This does not distiguish such philo-
sophy to such a degree as to overrule our 
previous pronouncements to the contrary. 
An examination of this record constrains 
us to sustain the trial court and to say that 
the evidence, looked at favorablv tn re-
spondent, reflects neither 
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George 0. SMITH, Deceased, and Llla J. 
Smith, widow, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the 
State of Utah et a I., Defendants. 
No. 14275. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 28, 1976. 
Deceased workman's widow sought 
review of adequacy of Industrial Commis-
sion award. The Supreme Court, Henriod, 
C. J., held that where workman was in-
jured in 1968 and died in 1972, benefits 
made available to widows under 1973 statu-
tory amendments were not available to the 
widow in question even though award was 
not made until 1975. 
Affirmed. 
:. Workmen's Compensation <§=>60 
Where workman was injured in 1968 
and died in 1972, additional benefits 
STATE v. VICEERS 
Cite as M9 P.2d 449 
Utah 449 
awardable under 1973 amendments were 
not available to the workman's wholly de-
pendent widow, even though award was 
not made until 1975. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68. 
2. Workmen's Compensation <S=>I934 
Failure of widow to join in employ-
er's petition for review and to ask for 
review within 15 days after the award 
precluded her from asserting any further 
claim to benefits beyond those awarded. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68, 35-1-82.55. 
Robert M. McRae, of Hatch, McRae & 
Richardson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Frank 
V, Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen.f Salt Lake 
City, for defendants. 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice: 
Review of the adequacy of a Commis-
sion award. Affirmed with no costs. 
This was a very protracted case, where 
an award was made on June 13, 1975, 
seven years after the injury of the ap-
plicant's husband, in the course of his em-
ployment, on May 7, 1968, when he fell 
from a ladder, injured his head against a 
pipe and died on May 25, 1972. 
[1] The petitioner urges one point on 
review: That the Commission did not 
award her, a wholly dependent widow, 
sufficient entitlement under Section 35-1-
68, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The bene-
fits were definable as to maximum time 
for payment and amount, were governed 
by the wording of the section on date 
of injury,1 and it appears the award fully 
complied with or exceeded such provi-
sions. (Laws Utah 1967, Ch. 65, Sec. 1.) 
Any additional benefits would not be 
awardable by amendment thereafter, and 
subsection 4. paragraphs 5 and 6 so amend-
ed in 1973 2 that did eniarge such benefits 
would have no application here. 
[2] Petitioner did not join in defend-
ants' petition for review, was not par-
ticeps thereto, and anyway, the issue 
raised by them are not those raised by 
her here. Besides, she did not ask for a 
review within 15 days after the award, as 
interdicted by Title 35-1-82.55, all of 
which has precluded her from asserting 
any claim further. 
ELLETT, CROCKETT, TUCKETT and 
MAUGHAN, JJ., concur. 
» SYSTEM^ 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Robert Maxson VICKERS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14300. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 28, 1976. 
Defendant was convicted in District 
Court, Washington County, J. Harlan 
Burns, J., of placing an infernal machine, 
and he appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Tuckett, J., held that the device affixed 
by defendant to an automobile came with-
in the statutory definition of an "infernal 
machine" and that the trial court correct-
ly refused to submit the crime of arson to 
Affirmed, 
I. Explosives <$=*2 
Device consisting of explosive, blast-
ing cap and length or fuse which, when 
used, provided lapse of time constituted 
• Utah Road Comm. v. Industrial t7om*»«f 
109 Utah 553, 168 ?.2d 319 (1946). 
549 P.2d—i9 
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additional opportunity to so misuse it," 
and the state accordingly loses none of 
its rights when the property is seized, 
sold, and the proceeds paid to any inno-
cent party who can prove a bona fide 
interest therein. 
Farmers & Merchants Bank of Trenton v. 
State, 167 Ga.App. 77, 306 S.E.2d 11, 13 
(1983) (quoting Hallman v. State, 141 Ga. 
App. 527, 233 S.E.2d 839, 840 (1977)). See 
also State v. Fouse, 120 Wis.2d 471, 355 
N.W.2d 366, 370 (CtApp.1984).3 
Even where a forfeiture statute express-
ly required that a security interest be per-
fected before it was exempted, the Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals held that although the 
holder of an unperfected interest could not 
prevent the forfeiture, the holder was still 
entitled to compensation for his or her in-
terest in the forfeited vehicle after the 
forfeiture had occurred. State v, Fouse, 
120 Wis.2d 471, 355 N.W.2d 366, 370 (Ct 
App.1984).4 
Based on the foregoing, we find the Lau-
ritos had a bona fide security interest un-
der § 5&-37-13. Accordingly, we affirm 
the trial court's award of the Trans Am to 
the State subject to the Lauritos' interest 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
(O f KEY NUMKR SYSTEM > 
3. Some courts have expressed a concern that 
allowing parties with unperfected security inter-
ests to maintain an interest in property subject 
to forfeiture will lead to fraudulent claims. We 
agree with the Alaska Supreme Court which 
observed that "the holder of an allegedly unper-
fected security interest must prove to the court 
that he or she has such an interest Placing 
the burden on the party asserting the interest to 
demonstrate the existence of a security interest 
will reduce the possibility of fraud." Fehir v. 
State, 755 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Alaska 1988). 
4. Cases holding that a security interest must be 
perfected before the holder's interest will be 
recognized under a criminal forfeiture statute 
all rely on statutory language which expressly 
requires perfection. See United States v. One 
1951 Douglas DCS Aircraft, 525 F.Supp. 13, 
15-16 (D.Tenn.i979), aff'a\ 667 ?2d 502 (6th 
WICAT SYSTEMS, and Hartford 
Insurance Group, Petitioners, 
v. 
Sylvia PELLEGRINI, Second Injury 
Fund of Utah, and Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Respondents. 
No. 880218-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 22, 1989. 
Injured employee filed claim with In-
dustrial Commission for permanent total 
disability. Following parties, stipulation as 
to disability, the Industrial Commission de-
termined that postinjury amendment to 
statute controlled computation of employ-
er's share of liability, and employer sought 
review. The Court of Appeals, Davidson, 
J., held that amendment to workers' com-
pensation statute which enlarged employ-
er's obligation by increasing its percentage 
of liability for employee's disability could 
not be applied retroactively. 
Reversed. 
1. Workers' Compensation <s=>55 
Employer's responsibilities to pay 
workers' compensation to employee whose 
wrist injury rendered her permanently and 
totally disabled was similar to a contractual 
Cir.1981), cert denied, 462 VS. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 
2451, 77 L.EcL2d 1332 (1982) (unsecured inter-
est of intervenor must yield to that of govern-
ment because statute provided that "no interest 
in an aircraft is valid against anyone other than 
the conveyor of the interest until the holder 
records it with the FAA"); In re Forfeiture of 
One 1979 Chevrolet CIO Van, 490 So.2d 240, 241 
(Fla.CtApp.1986) (court based its finding on 
statute specifically requiring that lien be perfect-
ed in manner prescribed by law); State v. One 
Certain Conveyance 1978 Dodge Magnum, 334 
N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1983) (claimant's lien 
must be "of record" at time of seizure in order 
to be deemed superior to State's interest upon 
forfeiture: statute provided that oniy iienhoid-
ers or record are entitled to receive notice of a 
forfeiture hearing). 
WICAT SYSTEMS v. PELLEGRINI 
Cite a* 771 P-2d 686 (UtahApp. 1989) 
Utah 687 
obligation for purposes of determining 
whether law affecting employer's liability 
could be retroactively applied. 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=»55 
Amendments to workers' compensation 
statute, under which employer's share of 
liability for disability of employee which 
was partially caused by work-related injury 
would be enlarged by statutory amend-
ments increasing percentage of liability, 
could not be retroactively applied. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-69; U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69 (Re-
pealed). 
been applied. The Commission denied Wi-
cat's motion. 
The sole issue before us is whether the 
1984 amendments to section 35-1-69 were 
procedural or remedial such that they could 
be applied retroactively to an injury that 
occurred before the effective date of the 
amendments.2 We hold that the amend-
ments were not remedial, and, therefore, 
did not apply retroactively. 
In workers' compensation cases, we gen-
erally apply the law existing at the time of 
injury. Moore v. American Coal Co., 737 
P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987); Kennecott 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 305, 
308 (Utah App.1987); Marshall v. Indus-
trial Comm\ 704 R2d 581, 582 (Utah 
1985). Under this rule, the 1981 version of 
section 35-1-69 would generally apply to 
Pellegrini's accident, since it was the law at 
the time she was injured. However, there 
are exceptions to this general rule. If 
amendments are procedural and do not en-
large, eliminate, or destroy vested or con-
tractual rights, the amended statute may 
be applied retroactively to accidents which 
occurred before the amendments became 
effective. Moore, 737 P.2d at 990. Fur-
thermore, if the amendments "deprive a 
party of rights or impose greater liability," 
but are enacted to "clarif[y] or amplif[y] 
how the earlier law should have been un-
derstood," in other words, remedial in na-
ture, the amendments can still be retroac-
tively applied. Kennecott Corp., 740 P.2d 
at 308. 
[1,2] In the instant case, Wicat's re-
sponsibilities to pay workers' compensation 
to Pellegrini were similar to contractual 
obligations. Utah Constr. Co. v. Mathe-
son, 534 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Utah 1975). The 
level of Wicaf s liability was set by the 
1981 version of the statute. However, 
when the 1984 amendments were enacted 
they increased the percentage of liability of 
Wicat, dius enlarging those obligations. 
These kinds of amendments 'It within :he 
category neia not to be retroactive. See 
"Vse ire wftoie person lmDairment oercent- 2. J I 1988. section ^5-I-o9 * 1984) was reoeaied. 
***- The rcenacted Utan Coae Ann. s 35-*-o9 (1988) 
aoandoned tne ianguage n question. 
U»«»ft«KJ 770-775 P 2d— 7 
Stuart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for 
appellants. 
Erie V. Boorman, Second Injury Fund, 
Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
Before DAVIDSON, BILLINGS and 
GARFF, JJ. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
On June 21, 1983, Sylvia Pellegrini, an 
employee of Wicat Systems, injured her 
wrist while at work. In 1987, Pellegrini 
filed a claim with the Industrial Commis-
sion for permanent total disability. The 
parties stipulated that Pellegrini had a 
preexisting impairment of 46% prior to 
1980, that she incurred an additional 12% 
impairment prior to 1983, that the injury to 
her wrist caused another 24% impairment,1 
and that she was now, with the wrist inju-
ry, ]5ermanently and totally disabled. The 
only issue before the Administrative Law 
Judge (A.LJ.) was the proper apportion-
ment between Wicat Systems and the Sec-
ond Injury Fund. 
The A.LJ. determined that Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-69 (as amended 1984) con-
trolled, even though Pellegrini's injury oc-
curred in 1983, and so computed Wicaf s 
•tare of the liability at ^wths or 37.5%. 
Wicat filed a motion for review claiming 
**t the 1981 version of section 35-1-59, 
*tucn womd have siaced its share of liaoili-
*y at i2/s4ths or 18.75%, inouid have <nstead 
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Kennecott, 740 P.2d at 308; cf. Moore, 737 
P.2d at 990. 
Pellegrini, however, argues that even 
though the 1984 amendments may have 
enlarged or increased Wicat's contractual 
obligations they were meant to clear up 
some confusion in the law under section 
35-1-69 as amended in 1981. Therefore, 
Pellegrini argues these amendments are re-
medial and retroactive. Pellegrini refers to 
Kerans v. Industrial Coram % 713 P.2d 49 
(Utah 1986), Jacobsen Construction v. 
Hair, 667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983), and North-
west Carriers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981) to show this confu-
sion. 
We are not persuaded by Pellegrini's ar-
gument Hair required use of combined 
impairment ratings in the equation rather 
than both whole and combined ratings. 
The other cases dealt with other closely 
connected issues, but did not directly con-
tradict or overturn Hair. We find no con-
fusion or ambiguity requiring clarification 
or amplification in these cases. The legis-
lature changed the statute to require use 
of both whole person and combined impair-
ment ratings to determine liability and did 
so in the 1984 amendments. However, that 
fact by itself does not require us to con-
clude the legislature was clarifying or am-
plifying the preexisting law. 
Since the 1984 amendments to section 
35-1-69 cannot be applied retroactively, the 
law controlling Pellegrini's case was the 
law in effect at the time of her injury. 
Accordingly, we apply the 1981 version of 
section 35-1-69 as interpreted by the Hair 
case. Under that formulation, Wicat's por-
tion of liability for Pellegrini's injury 
is ^/wths or 18.75%. 
The order of the Commission is reversed. 
Liability is apportioned ^/wths or 18.75% to 
Wicat and 5^ths or 81.25% to the Second 
Injury Fund. 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Joseph MORITZSKY, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 880395-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 23, 1989. 
Defendant was convicted in the Uintah 
County Court, Dennis L. Draney, J., of 
aggravated assault, and he appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that de-
fendant did not receive effective assistance 
of counsel in aggravated assault trial 
where his counsel obtained a defense of 
habitation instruction in accord with inap-
plicable pre-1985 version of applicable stat-
ute which failed to incorporate statutory 
presumption that defendant acted reason-
ably assuming it found the defense other-
wise applicable. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Assault and Battery «=»69, 82 
Homicide <s*123,151(1) 
Where a defendant entitled to assert 
defense of habitation establishes that he 
used force in defense of his habitation 
against unlawful entry or attempted entry 
and, in case of deadly force, that unlawful 
entry was violent, tumultuous, surrepti-
tious, in stealth, or for purpose of commit-
ting a felony, defendant's actions and be-
liefs will be presumed reasonable and State 
must rebut presumption to invalidate the 
defense. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-405. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>641.13(2) 
Defendant did not receive effective as-
sistance of counsel in aggravated assault 
trial where his counsel obtained a defense 
of habitation instruction in accord with in-
applicable pre-1985 version of statute 
which tailed to incorporate statutory pre-
sumption of reasonableness of defendant's 
EXHIBIT M0" 
2§P# ift/-r */ 
State v. Naisbitt 
181 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 
Q CODE^CO 
Provo. Utah 
5 search, when, in fact, Tollefson subsequently 
Fused to consent to the trooper's search of the 
hide. These facts allow for the equally valid 
nclusion that defendant consented to the search 
ily if Tollefson likewise gave her consent. Such 
nditional consent would not necessarily meet the 
nirth Amendment's requirement of consent' in 
ct. See Schncckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
\&, 93 S. Ct. 2041,2059 (1973). 
See also United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208, 
)9-10 (10th Cir. 1986)(officer smelling "strong 
Jor of marijuana" on driver gave officer probable 
luse to search vehicle without warrant); United 
tales v. Spcrow, 551 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir.), cert, 
enied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S. Ct. 2634 (1977); United 
tates v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229, 1231 (10th 
ir. 1973); accord United States v. Marshall, 878 
.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1989)("[0]nce the officer 
etected the odor of marijuana, probable cause 
usted to search the vehicle."); United States v. 
leed, 882 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1989)(The officer 
detected the distinct odor of burnt marihuana, and 
tiis in itself would have justified the subsequent 
earch of [the] vehicle."); United States, v. Haley, 
69 F.2d 201, 204 (4th Cir.)(patroIman had probable 
ause after he stopped speeding automobile, smelled 
Qtense odor of marijuana emanating from driver's 
K>dy while he sat in police cruiser, and also smelled 
trong marijuana odor when passenger roiled down 
vindow of stopped vehicle), cert, denied, 457 U.S. 
[117, 102 S. Ct. 2928 (1982); State v. Koch, 455 So. 
id 492, 494 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984)("Once the stop was 
nade, the officer's detection of the odor of marij-
iana was probable cause for the search."). 
$. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has held that a search following an 
afficer's detection of the odor of marijuana is jus-
tified under the vehicle exception to the warrant 
requirement. United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 
1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1991X*The smell of marijuana, 
the false floor and ceiling, and [defendant's] nerv-
ousness together gave [the officer] probable cause to 
inspect the truck, which falls within the vehicle 
exception to the warrant requirement. ")(citing Cal-
ifornia v, Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-93, 105 S. Ct. 
2066, 2068-70 (1985); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U.S. 42,50-51,90 S. Ct. 1975,1980-81 (1970)). 
7. Defendant does not challenge the search under 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. We, 
therefore, are precluded from analyzing the search 
under the Utah Constitution. See State v. Belgard, 
811 P.2d 211,215-16 (Utah App. 1991). 
We note, however, the standard required by the 
Utah Constitution may not parallel the federal sta-
ndard. Recently, in considering the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement, the Utah 
Supreme Court disagreed with federal decisions 
holding no showing of exigent circumstances is 
necessary to search a vehicle without a warrant. See, 
e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066. Reas-
oning the federal decisions "cannot be squared with 
the oft-stated principle that warrants-when-
practicable is the best policy," in State v. Larocco 
the Utah Supreme Court held Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution requires /both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances [be] oresent at the 
time of the searcn." 794 P 2d 460, 470 (Utah
 A990); 
accord State v. Sims, 308 P.2d 141 Utah App. 
1991). The considerations requiring i lowing oi 
exigent circumstances under the automobile excep-
tion seem to apply with equal force to tne searcn oi 
a vemcie oased on an olficer aetecting tne oaor oi 
marijuana. 
We are troubled that when existing law demonst-
rates a difference between federal and state law, 
parties fail even to mention, much less brief, state 
constitutional issues. Until and unless parties brief 
search and seizure questions under the state consti-
tution, Utah's citizens will remain at the mercy of 
the "labyrinth of rules built upon a series of contr-
adictory and confusing rationalizations and distinc-
tions" marking federal search and seizure law. Stare 
v. Hygh, 711 P .2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 
1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
8. We make no statement as to whether our decision 
would be the same if Trooper BushnelTs search had 
not, in fact, found marijuana in the vehicle. Cf. Ar-
royo, 796 P.2d at 688 (search and seizure based 
on pretext violated constitution). 
Cite as 
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Daniel G . Darger, Salt Lake City, for 
Petitioner 
ATTORNEYS: 
R. Paul Van Dam and Robert Steed, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Dr. James Ferro seeks licensure 
as a psychologist in the State of Utah. The 
Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing (Division) denied his application. 
Dr. Ferro has petitioned this court to review 
the Division's denial of his application. We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
Dr. Ferro received his doctoral degree in 
psychology from the Union for Experimenting 
Colleges and Universities (UECU) in 1980. At 
that time, J E C U was not an accredited msfr 
tution. la 1985, UECU became accredited wun 
the regional accrediting body. fn 1986, Or. 
Ferro bougnt licensure as a psychologist in tn 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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State of Utah by filing an application with the 
Division. That application was denied because 
Or. Ferro's doctoral degree was not from an 
accredited university as required by subsection 
V2Xc) o( the Psychologists' Licensing Act 
JheAct). Utah Code Ann. §58-25a-l to-
13(1990).* 
In 1990, Dr. Ferro submitted a second 
amplication to the Division. The application 
Indicated that five months earlier, Dr. Ferro 
had received a license as a psychologist in 
California. He therefore requested that his 
application be considered under the recently 
added reciprocity provision for psychologists 
licensed to practice in other states. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-25a-5 (1990). Again, the 
Division denied his application, indicating in a 
letter that "California's licensure requirements 
arc not equal to Utah's requirements and that 
your licensure status in California is not sub-
stantially in compliance with the provisions of 
the Psychology Licensing Act." As the Divi-
sion admits, neither the Division nor the 
Psychologists' Licensing Board (Board) con-
ducted a complete evaluation of Dr. Ferrous 
application because of the Division's determ-
ination that Dr. Ferro failed to meet the thr-
eshold requirement of having completed a 
doctoral program at an accredited school. 
h Dr. Ferro sought and obtained a review of 
the denial of his application by a special 
appeals board called by the Division. Follo-
wing the hearing, the special appeals board 
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law recommending rejection of Dr. Ferro's 
application because he did not meet the 
minimum mandatory education requirements 
found in Utah Code Ann. §58-25a-3 
("section 3"). The Division followed the rec-
ommendation of the special appeals board and 
rejected Dr. Ferro's second application.2 
Dr. Ferro claims his doctoral degree satisfies 
the education requirements of section 3 
because UECU was accredited at the time he 
applied for licensure. In the alternative, he 
asserts that he qualifies for a case-by-case 
review of his qualifications under the terms of 
Utah's reciprocity statute, and that any stat-
utory bar against him applying for licensure is 
unconstitutional.3 
Dr. Ferro also asserts that he is entitled to 
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988. We 
decline to address this issue, however, because 
Dr. Ferro's brief lacks sufficient legal analysis 
to support the claim. See Utah R. App. P, 
2%)(9) (1991) ("The argument shall contain 
fiae contentions and reasons ot the appellant 
^uh '-espect to Lhe .ssues presented, wuh cit-
rons fo the iuthonties rand] statutes .* 
^ e d on.7); Utah R. Aop. 3 . 18 (1991) 
* appelate mies aopiy equally to administrative 
Petitions). See also State v. Price, 180 Utah 
^dv. Rep. 25, 26 (Utah App. 1992) , 
^appellant's briet must contain adequate legal | doctoral aegree .rom a ^cnool that was aot 
aoaiysis or we will assume the tnbunal acted I accreditea at the time ne graduated satisfies 
properly).4 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Division's actions are governed by the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), 
Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-l to-22 
(1989). Dr. Ferro claims he is entitled to relief 
under subsection 16(4)(d), which provides that 
we may grant relief if an agency's interpreta-
tion of the law is erroneous. We review stat-
utory interpretations by agencies for correct-
ness, giving no deference to the agency's int-
erpretation, unless the statute grants to the 
agency the discretion to interpret the statute. 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581,588 (Utah 1991). 
A grant of discretion to interpret a statute 
may be explicit or implicit. Id. at 588. There is 
no explicit grant of discretion provided in the 
Act whereby the Division is directed to inter-
pret the language involved here. We therefore 
must determine whether there is an implicit 
grant of discretion. Id. at 589. To do so, we 
first determine whether the statute is ambig-
uous. If the statute is clear and unambiguous, 
there is no implicit grant of discretion possible 
because there is no interpretation required by 
the agency. The agency simply applies the 
statute according to its plain language.5 
If a statute is ambiguous, however, we 
apply traditional rules of statutory construc-
tion under the assumption that the Legislature 
was operating under such rules. We also 
assume that the Legislature expected the 
agency to likewise apply the traditional rules 
of statutory interpretation. No deference is 
therefore given to the agency's interpretation 
if an otherwise ambiguous statute may be 
interpreted in accordance with traditional rules 
of interpretation. See Morton at 589. 
If, however, a traditional analysis of the 
statute does not resolve the ambiguities and 
"there is no discernible legislative intent con-
cerning a specific issue[,] the Legislature has, 
in effect, left the issue unresolved. In such a 
case, it is appropriate to conclude that the 
Legislature has delegated authority to the 
agency to decide the issue." Id. We assume 
that the Legislature expected the agency to use 
its expertise in choosing between the possible 
permissible interpretations. Id. The choice of 
interpretations in such cases is therefore 
viewed as a policy decision by the agency to 
which we give deference. Id.6 As is apparent 
from our analysis, we find no explicit or 
implicit grant of discretion to the Division in 
this case and therefore aopty a correction-of-
error standard o the Division's interpretation 
of the Act. 
ANALYSIS 
Accreditation 
First ve address Dr. Ferro s uaim that ais 
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tie statutory requirement of a doctoral degree i 
rom an accredited institution. According to j 
)r. Ferro, his degree satisfies this requirement 
ecause UECU was accredited at the time of 
is application. The Division, however, held as 
matter of law that Dr. Ferro's doctoral 
egree did not satisfy the educational requir-
ment because the school was not accredited at 
le time Dr. Ferro attended and graduated. 
>r. Ferro asserts that the educational requir-
nent is ambiguous on this point. 
Section 3 provides that in order for an 
pplicant to sit for the exam, the applicant 
tust "produce certified transcripts of credit 
om an accredited institution of higher edu-
ition recognized by the division verifying 
itisfactory completion of a doctoral degree in 
sychology." Section 58-25a-3(2)(c). Dr. 
;rro asserts that the phrase "certified trans-
ipts of credit from an accredited institution" 
dicates that the transcript must come from 
1 institution that is accredited at the time the 
anscript is submitted; in other words, the 
irase "from an accredited institution" qual-
les the term "transcript." The Division on the 
her hand, asserts that the credit must be 
om an institution accredited at the time the 
edit and doctoral degree are received; in 
her words, the phrase "from an accredited 
stitution" qualifies the term "credit." When 
ewed in isolation, this provision is ambig-
>us because it "can be understood by reaso-
ibly well-informed persons to have diffe-
nt meanings." Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 
9 P.2d 231,233 (Utah App. 1990). 
In determining whether the Legislature has 
tplicitly granted the Division the discretion 
interpret this education requirement, we 
st apply traditional statutory rules of cons-
iction. "[Qualifying words and phrases are 
nerally regarded as applying to the immed-
ely preceding words, rather than to more 
mote ones." Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
yunty, 568 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1977) 
>otnote omitted). Under this "last antecedent 
le," the Division's interpretation is clearly 
rrect. 
The Division's interpretation is also supp-
ted by another cardinal rule of construction: 
f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the 
ianing or application of the provisions of an 
t, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its 
tirety, in light of its objective, and to har-
>nize its provisions in accordance with the 
;islative intent and purpose." Osuala v. 
nna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 
80) (footnotes omitted). The purpose of the | 
t "s to protect the public from unqualified I 
rsons by ensuring that applicants for licen-
ce have certain minimum qualifications. See i 
tion58-25a-i. 
\ requirement that an applicant present a 
*ree rrom an institution that is accreditea at 
' time of application, without any regard tor 
ether the school was accredited at h^e fime 
the degree was obtained, would be useless in 
ensuring a minimum standard of education. 
The accreditation status of a school at the 
time of application has no rational bearing on 
the quality of education actually received by 
the applicant. Accreditation at the time the 
student attended, on the other hand, is indic-
ative of the quality of education received. A 
requirement of accreditation at the time of 
graduating therefore furthers the purpose of 
ensuring certain minimum educational stand-
ards. Under Dr. Ferro's interpretation, a 
graduate of a fully accredited and perhaps 
even highly prestigious school could be barred 
from applying for licensure in this state if, 
following the applicant's graduation, the 
school were to lose its accreditation. Such a 
result would clearly be illogical and inconsis-
tent with the purpose of the Act. 
Inasmuch as the statute may be interpreted 
in accordance with traditional rules of statu-
tory construction, we conclude that the Legi-
slature has not left this issue unresolved. We 
therefore need not give any deference to the 
Division's interpretation. We nevertheless 
uphold the Division's interpretation as 
correct.7 Dr. Ferro's doctoral degree, which is 
from an institution that was not accredited at 
the time the degree was obtained, does not 
satisfy the educational requirement found in 
subsection 3(2)(c) of the Act. 
Reciprocity 
Dr. Ferro next argues that even if his doct-
oral degree does not satisfy the minimum 
educational requirements for licensure found 
in section 3, he is entitled as a licensed psyc-
hologist in the State of California to an indi-
vidual review of his credentials under the 
reciprocity provision found in section 5 of the 
Act. The reciprocity provision provides that: 
The division with the approval of 
the board may issue a license under 
this chapter to an applicant who is 
currently licensed as a psychologist 
in any state, district, or territory of 
the United States or in any other 
jurisdiction approved by the board, 
and whose education, experience, 
examination, and character requir-
ements are, or were at the time the 
license was issued, equal to the 
requirements of this chapter or upon a 
finding by the board that 
the applicant, based upon educa-
tion, experience, examination, and 
licensure status is substantially in 
compliance with ,he provisions of 
this cnapter. 
Utah Code Ann. S58-25a-5 (1990) 
(emohasis added). 
"Tie ^peciai appeals ooard +ound that 
oecause the State ol California ioes not 
require i degree trom an accredited nstitu-
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tion,8 California's requirements were not in 
actual or substantial compliance with Utah's 
requirements.9 The special appeals board also 
indicated that since the Board does not have 
express statutory authority to conduct an 
independent review of a non-accredited 
school's doctoral program, as does Califo-
rnia's board, that the requirement of a doct-
oral degree from an accredited school is 
mandatory for all applicants. The special 
appeals board therefore concluded that 
nothing short of actual compliance in the form 
of a doctoral degree from an accredited school 
would suffice, regardless of the reciprocity 
provision. 
Dr. Ferro claims that the special appeals 
board nuisinterpreted the Act by ignoring the 
reciprocity provision with its express reference 
to substantial compliance. According to Dr. 
Ferro, the reciprocity provision grants him an 
opportunity to become licensed in Utah, even 
if he does not meet all of the minimum requ-
irements found in section 3. Dr* Ferro asserts 
that the Board may grant him a license if it 
finds his credentials to be sufficient to meet 
the purpose of the Act, i.e., protecting the 
public from unqualified applicants. See gene-
rally Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204, 
206 (Utah App. 1988) (substantial compliance 
is appropriate when the purpose of the statute 
"can be accomplished in a manner other than 
that prescribed, with substantially the same 
results."1 (quoting Wilcox v. Billings, 200 
Kan. 654, 659,438 P.2d 108,112 (1968)). 
The Etivision contends, that the substantial 
compliance language is of no effect because 
there is no other statutory language expressly 
permitting the board to admit an applicant 
with less than the mandatory minimum requ« 
irements found in section 3. What the Division 
fails to acknowledge, however, is that the 
reciprocity provision itself is the statutory 
authorization for adjusting the minimum 
requirements for reciprocity applicants. 
The Division resorts to the well-established 
rule of statutory construction that specific 
provisions prevail over general provisions. 
Williams v. Public Service Comm'n, ISA P.2d 
41, 48 (Utah 1988). The Division misapplies 
the rule, however, by mischaracterizing what is 
specific and what is general. The Division 
views section 3 as the more specific provision. 
Section 3, however, applies generally to all 
applicants. The reciprocity provision applies 
only to a subgroup of all applicants, i.e., 
reciprocity applicants, and is therefore the 
more specific provision. See Williams, 754 
P.2d at 48 (provisions of title 54 of the Code 
are nore CDecific than UAPA since title 54 
applies only to the Public Service Commission 
ana regulated utilities, whiie UAPA applies to 
ail agencies); Southern Jtan Wilderness Alli-
dnce v. 3oard of State Lands and Forestry, 
No. 910129, olio op. at 4 (Utah Feb. 27, 1992) 
(provision oi UAPA exoressiy excluding from 
ment of Commerce , -
lv. Rep. 60 OO 
its effect contracts for the sale of real property 
by all agencies is superseded by provision of 
title 65A expressly mandating that board's 
actions are governed by UAPA). See also 
Osuala, 608 P.2d at 242-43 (section limiting 
insurance coverage to three classes of persons 
prevailed over general purpose language). By 
its own terms, the reciprocity provision is 
therefore a specific exception from the general 
requirements of section 3. 
The reciprocity provision is clearly intended 
to allow licensure of applicants with less than 
the minimum requirements set forth in section 
3 because of their licensed status in other 
states. If the Legislature did not intend to 
limit or modify section 3, i.e., if it intended 
that reciprocity applicants strictly comply with 
that section, there would have been no need 
for a reciprocity provision. The reciprocity 
applicants would simply qualify directly under 
section 3. 
To interpret the Act so as to ignore the 
reciprocity provision's express exception fiom 
the general requirements of section 3, would 
be to rewrite the Act and impermissibly render 
the reciprocity provision a complete nullity. See 
Williams v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 
763 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1988) (agency may 
not rewrite legislation); Downey State Bank v. 
Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 
(Utah 1978) (statutes should be read so as to 
avoid making any of their provisions 
* surplusage and meaningless"); Bagshaw v. 
Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 
1990) (applying general rather than specific 
provision would effectively repeal the specific 
provision). To adopt the Division's interpre-
tation would also be contrary to our duty to 
"construe a statute on the assumption that 
each term is used advisedly and that the intent 
of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the 
term in the context and structure in which it is 
placed." Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 
265, 266 (Utah 1984). See also Madsen v„ 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.U (Utah 1988) 
(appellate courts have fundamental duty to 
give effect, if possible, to every word of a 
statute). 
[A] statute should be applied acco-
rding to its literal wording unless it 
is unreasonably confused or inope-
rable. We must assume that each 
term in the statute was used advis-
edly by the Legislature and that 
each should be interpreted and 
applied according to its usually 
accepted meaning. 
West Jordan v. Morrison, 556 ?.2d 445, 446 
(Utah 1982) (citation omitted). 
The reciprocity provision s exception co ine 
general requirements of section 3 is not cont-
used or moDeraoie. 'We must oe guided y^ 
the law as t :s. We cannot ay construction 
Uberaiize the statute and enlarge its provisions. 
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/hen language is clear and unambiguous, it 
mst be held to mean what it expresses, and 
o room is left for construction." Hanchett v. 
\urbidge, 59 Utah 127, 202 P . 377, 380 
1921). We therefore must give effect to the 
lain and unambiguous terms of the recipro-
ity provision by recognizing that it creates an 
xception to the general requirements found in 
xt ion 3.10 
The Legislature has chosen to make the 
action 3 requirements merely advisory as to 
sciprocity applicants. If the Division wishes 
3 alter the Act to require that reciprocity 
pplicants have a doctoral degree from an 
ccredited school, its recourse is to the Legis-
iture. The Division may not simply impose 
additional requirements for psychologist lic-
nsure that are not contained within the plain 
leaning of the statutory language." Fussell v. 
department of Commerce, 815 P.2d 250, 254 
UtahApp. 1991)o 
CONCLUSION 
Since the reciprocity provision allows the 
toard to make a finding as to whether Dr. 
7erro's credentials are in substantial compli-
mce with the Act's requirements, we hold 
hat it was error for the Division to disqualify 
lim from the application process without the 
3oard conducting an individualized review of 
lis credentials.1 1 We emphasize that our 
lolding should not be misconstrued as requi-
ring that Dr. Ferro be admitted to practice 
psychology in Utah. Under the reciprocity 
provision, that decision remains in the sound 
discretion of the Board.12 
The Division's rejection of Dr. Ferro's 
application is hereby reversed. 
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
I CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1. Utah Code Ann. §58-25a-3(2) (1990) prov-
ides: 
Each applicant for admission to the 
licensure examination shall: 
(a) complete an application for adm-
ission as specified by the division in 
collaboration with the board; 
(b) produce satisfactory evidence that 
he is of good moral character; 
(c) produce certified transcripts of 
credit from an accredited institution of 
higher education recognized by the div-
ision verifying satisfactory completion of 
a doctoral degree in psychology. The 
applicant must have also successfully 
completed specific core course work as 
defined by the division by rule; 
(d) produce documented evidence that 
the applicant has completed two vears ol 
supervised, protessionai experience, ol 
vhicn one year snail be postdoctoral in 
accordance with rules established by the 
division in collaboration with the board; 
and 
(e) pay a fee to the department as 
determined by it in accordance with 
Subsection 63-38-3(2). 
2. The Division was bound by statute to follow the 
recommendation of the special appeals board. Utah 
Code Ann. §58-l-17(4)(b) (1990). 
3. Inasmuch as we may resolve t£$$ petition on sta-
tutory grounds, we do not reach the constitutional 
arguments. See State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 
1103 (Utah 1988) (it is a fundamental rule that 
appellate courts should avoid addressing constituti-
onal issues unless required to do so). 
4. Dr. Ferro's claim contains many first impression 
issues that are not even recognized in his brief. In 
particular, Dr. Ferro's brief fails to show how this 
administrative petition is an "action or proceeding 
to enforce a provision of ... the Civil Rights Act of 
1964." 42 U.S.C. §1988. The brief also does not 
address the United States Supreme Court's holding 
in Will v. Michigan Dcp't of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989), that a state is not 
a "person* for purposes of section 1983 damages. 
Dr. Ferro's brief also ignores section 17 of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, which provides that 
this court may award damages "only to the extent 
expressly authorized by statute" when considering a 
petition to review agency action. Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-17(l)(a)(1989). 
5. If "statutory language is plain and unambig-
uous," we "will not look beyond to divine legislative 
intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a 
statute should be construed according to its plain 
language." Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 
763 P.2d 806,809 (Utah 1988). 
6. But see State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1977) (improper delegation of legislative powers); 
Crowther v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 
1119, 1122 (Utah App. 1988) (legislative policy 
decisions may not be delegated to agencies). 
7. In an attempt to support its ruling on this matter, 
the Division relies upon its own administrative rule 
interpreting the Act. Rule R153-25a-4(2) (1991) 
of the Utah Administrative Code provides, with our 
emphasis, that "(ajn acceptable doctoral degree in 
psychology shall meet the following criteria: (a) the 
degree shall have been received from an institution 
of higher education in the United States or Canada 
which was accredited by a regional institutional 
accrediting body ... at the time the applicant's 
degree was earned.'' 
The Division erroneously views its rule as deter-
minative of the proper interpretation of the statute. 
Given the established rule that agency regulations 
may not "abridge, enlarge, extend or modify the 
statute creating the right or imposing the duty," IML 
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296, 297 
(Utah 1975), it is the statute, not the rule, that 
governs. If an agency regulation is not in harmony 
with the statute, it is invalid. Agency rules are the-
refore of little value in interpreting a statute unless 
I the discretion to interpret the statute has been exp-
i licitiy or implicitly granted to the agency by the 
| Legislature. Since in tnis case we hold that no sucn 
i aiscretion was granted to the Division, we do not 
teiv uDon its one in our nterpretation. We recog-
nize, lowever, that R.uie R153-25a-4 is in 
i narmony witn the Act in that the rule incorporates 
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 35-1-67 
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall 
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $50 per week. 
Commencing July 1, 1974, all persons who were permanently and totally 
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation bene-
fits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation benefits 
from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate sufficient 
to bring their weekly benefit to $50 when combined with employer or in-
surance carrier compensation payments. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the 
vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission 
of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the 
commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be 
heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabili-
tation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to 
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total 
disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, however, 
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some 
loss of Bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent 
disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided 
in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in 
excess of 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week for 312 weeks. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, §78; C*. L. maximum from $16 to $22.50 and weekly 
1917, §3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1 ; R, S. minimum from $7 to $10; added a proviso 
1933, 42-1-63; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1 ; 1939, to the first sentence which read: "pro-
ch. 51, § 1 ; C. 1943, 42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. vided, however, that in no case of perma-
65, § 1 ; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1 ; nent total disability shall more than 
1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, $8,500 be required to be paid"; and added 
ch. 55, § 1 ; 1961, ch. 71, § 1 ; 1963, ch. 49, a second paragraph which read: "In case 
§ 1 ; 1965, ch. 68, § 1 ; 1967, ch. 65, § 1 ; the permanent total disability begins after 
1969, ch. 86, § 5 ; 1971, ch. 76, § 6 ; 1973, a period of temporary total disability, the 
ch. 67, §4 ; 1974, ch. 13, § 1. period of temporary disability shall be 
deducted from the total period of corn-
Compiler's Notes. pensation." 
The 1937 amendment inserted "plus five The 1949 amendment rewrote the section 
per cent of such award for each dependent to read: "In cases of permanent total dis-
minor child, as in this act defined, up to ability the award shall be sixty per cent 
a maximum of five such dependent minor of the average weekly wages for five years 
children" in the first sentence; and deleted from date of injury, and thereafter 45 per 
"a minimum of" near the end of the first cent of such average weekly wages, but 
sentence. not to exceed a maximum of $25 per week 
The 1939 amendment substituted "under and not less than $15 per week, plus five 
the age of eighteen years" for "as in this per cent of such award for each dependent 
act defined" in the first sentence. minor child under the age of eighteen 
The 1945 amendment deleted "until the years up to a maximum of five such de-
death of such person so totally disabled" pendent minor children; provided however, 
xii Lhe *irst sentence; increased weeKly that in no case of permanent total dis-
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ability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay more than 
$11,000; and provided further, that a 
finding by the commission of permanent 
total disability shall in all cases be tenta-
tive and not final until such time as the 
following proceedings have been had: 
"Where the employee has tentatively 
been found to be permanently and totally 
disabled, it shall be mandatory that the 
industrial commission of Utah refer such 
employee to the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of 
education for rehabilitation training and 
it shall be the duty of the commission to 
order paid to such vocational rehabilita-
tion division, out of that special fund 
provided for by section 42-1-64, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943? as amended, subdivision 
1, not to exceed $520 for use in the re-
habilitation and training of such em-
ployee; the rehabilitation and training 
of such employee shall generally follow 
the practice applicable under section 42-1-
65, Utah Code Annotated 3943, as amend-
ed, and relating to the rehabilitation of 
employees having combined injuries. If 
and when the division of vocational re-
habilitation under the state board of 
education certifies to the industrial com-
mission of Utah in writing that such em-
ployee has fully co-operated with the 
division of vocational rehabilitation in its 
efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the 
opinion of the division the employee may 
not be rehabilitated, then the .commission 
shall order that there be paid tQ_ sueh 
employee wegk^^bftUfi^tR a* thp ntp. of 
4fT~per cent of his average weekly earn-
ings, but not to exceed $25 per week, inii-
of that jpecial fund .nravid&d for by_§_g£s 
tion 42-1-64, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
as amended, for such j>eriod of time_J>e-
ginning with the times that the payments 
(as in this section provided) to be made 
by theempjoy^er or its insurance carrier 
fi^mlnateand ending, witft the death ^af 
fhr^ntployeee £To employee, however, shall 
ffQ eiltitTed'to any such payments if he 
fails or refuses to co-operate with the 
division of vocational rehabilitation as set 
forth herein. 
"The division of vocational rehabilita-
tion shall, at the termination of the voca-
tional training of the employee, certify to 
the industrial commission of Utah the 
work the employee is qualified to per-
form, and thereupon the commission shall, 
after notice to the employer and an oppor-
tunity to be heard, determine whether the 
employee has, notwithstanding such re-
habilitation, sustained a loss of bodily 
function. 
aThe loss or permanent and complete 
loss of use of both hands or both arms, 
or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or 
of any two thereof, shall constitute total 
and permanent disability, to be compen-
sated according to the provisions of this 
section and no tentative finding of per-
manent total disability shall be required 
in such instances; in all other cases, how-
ever, and where there has been rehabili-
tation effected but where there is some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be 
based upon partial permanent disability, j 
"In no case shall the employer be re-
quired to pay compensation for any com-
bination of disabilities of any kind in-
cluding loss of function, in excess of 
$11,000." 
The 1951 amendment increased the max-
imum weekly benefits allowable from $25 
to $27.50; and increased the minimum 
weekly benefits allowable from $15 to 
$17.50. 
The 1955 amendment increased the maxi-
mum weekly benefits allowable for per-
manent total disability from $27.50 to 
$30; increased the minimum weekly bene-
fits allowable from $17.50 to $19.50; in-
creased the percentage of award for de-
pendent minor children from 5% to 7%; 
increased the maximum payment allow-
able from $11,000 to $12,100; and in-
creased the payment to a vocational re-
habilitation division for the training of 
such disabled employee from $520 to $600. 
The 1957 amendment increased the max-
imum weekly benefits allowable from $30 
to $35; increased the minimum weekly 
benefits allowable from $19.50 to $22.75; 
increased the maximum payment allowable 
from $12,100 to $14,116.71; and increased 
the payment to a vocational rehabilitation 
division for the training of such disabled 
employee from $600 to $700. 
The 1959 amendment increased the max-
imum weekly benefits from $35 to $37; in-
creased the minimum weekly benefits from 
$22.75 to $24; increased the maximum pay-
ment allowable from $14,116.71 to $14,-
822.55; made provision for a dependent 
wife and changed the basis of payment 
for a dependent minor child from a per-
centage to a specific amount of $2.50; 
reduced the number of dependent minor 
children eligible for award from five to 
four; and increased the payment to a vo-
cational rehabilitation division for the 
training of such disabled employee from 
$700 to $735. 
The 1961 amendment increased the max-
imum weekly benefits from $37 to $39; in-
creased the provisions for dependent wife 
and minor children from $2.50 to $2.75; 
and increased the maximum oavinent from 
$14,822.55 to $15,415. 
The 1963 amendment increased the max-
imum weekly benefits from $39 to $40: in-
creased the minimum weekly benefits from 
$24 to .-B25; increased the provisions for 
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dependent wife and minor children from 
$2.75 to $2.85; increased the payment to 
the vocational rehabilitation division for 
the training of such disabled employee 
from $735 to $753; and increased the max-
imum payment allowable from $15,415 to 
$15,800. 
The 1965 amendment increased the max-
imum weekly benefits from $40 to $42; in-
creased the provisions for dependent wife 
and minor children' from $2.85 to $3.60; 
increased the payment to vocational re-
habilitation division for the training of 
such disabled employee from $753 to $830; 
and increased the maximum payment al-
lowable from $15,800 to $18,720. 
The 1967 amendment increased the max-
imum weekly benefits from $42 to $44; 
and increased the maximum payment al-
lowable from $18,720 to $19,344. 
The 1969 amendment increased the max-
imum weekly benefits from $44 to $47; in-
creased the minimum weekly benefits from 
$25 to $27; mereased the payment to the 
vocational rehabilitation division for the 
training of such disabled employee from 
$830 to $890; and increased the maximum 
payment allowable from $19,344 to $20,280. 
The 1971 amendment increased the max-
imum weekly benefits from $47 to $54; in-
creased the minimum weekly benefits from 
$27 to $29; increased the provisions for 
dependent wife and minor children from 
$3.60 to $5.00; increased the maximum 
payment allowable from $20,280 to $24,-
648; inserted the third paragraph relating 
to the special fund; and made minor 
changes in phraseology. 
The 1973 amendment substituted "em-
ployee shall receive 6 6 ^ % * * * minimum 
of $35" in the first sentence of the first 
paragraph for "award shall be sixty per 
cent of the actual weekly wages for five 
years from date of injury, and thereafter 
forty-five per cent of such average weekly 
wages, but not to exceed a maximum of 
$54 per week and not less than $29"; 
added "but not to exceed 66y3% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week" to the first sentence; 
substituted "such weekly compensation 
payments for more than 312 weeks" for 
"more than $24,648" in the second sen-
tence; changed the statutory references 
from "35-1-68" to "35-1-68(1)" in the sec-
ond paragraph; substituted "$1000" for 
"$890" in the first sentence of the second 
paragraph; substituted "662^% of his 
average weekly wages at the time of the 
injury * * * weekly wage at the time of 
the injury" in the second sentence of the 
second paragraph for "45% of his average 
weekly earnings, but not to exceed $54"; 
substituted *benehts" lor "payments" n 
^ho third sentence or the second para-
graph; substituted "on that date or prior 
thereto were" for "now" in the third para-
graph; substituted "$50" for "$44" in the 
third paragraph; deleted "This section 
shall apply to all persons permanently and 
totally disabled who are now receiving 
or hereafter become entitled to receive 
compensation benefits from the special 
fund" from the third paragraph; inserted 
"or the insurance carrier" near the begin-
ning of the final paragraph; and inserted 
"as provided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 
and this section"; substituted "66%% of 
the state average weekly wage * * * per 
week for 312 weeks" for "$24,648" at the 
end of the former fourth paragraph. 
The 1974 amendment inserted the fourth 
paragraph. 
Arm injuries. 
Where there was no complete and per-
manent loss or loss of use of both arms so 
that claimant would be permanently dis-
abled as matter of law, it was for com-
mission to decide from all the facts and 
circumstances in evidence whether he was 
so disabled. Johnson v. Industrial Conim., 
93 U. 493, 73 P. 2d 1308. 
Determination of character of disability., 
Whether an employee is totally disabled 
or permanently disabled are ultimate mat-
ters to be decided by the commission, as 
ifc also amount and time compensation 
may be awarded upon all the evidence; 
and upon these ultimate questions expert 
witnesses may not properly express opin-
ions, nor may such opinions relating to 
loss of bodily function become measure of 
compensable function possessed by an 
employee prior to his injury. Spencer v. 
Industrial Comm., 87 U. 336, 40 P. 2d 1S8, 
affd. 87 U. 358, 48 P. 2d 1120. 
Where there had never been a deter-
mination by the commission that the in-
jured employee was permanently disabled, 
and where he did not have injuries which 
entitled him to a conclusive presumption 
of permanent disability, whether or not he 
Was permanently disabled is a question of 
fact to be decided by the commission on 
all the evidence after notice to and hear-
ing of the parties. Utah State Road Comm. 
v. Industrial Comm., 109 U. 553, 168 P. 2d 
319. 
Uye injuries. 
Injury to vision of employee from elec-
tric flash was not permanent total disabil-
ity within this section. Moray v. Indus-
trial Comm., 58 U. 404, 199 P. 1023, ex-
plained in 15 XT. (2d) 208, 390 P. 2d 125. 
Findings. 
Finding of commission upon ultimate 
*"act or *otai ind permanent disanility, 
nncic evidence is ('onriicting, will not be 
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